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Lambert: Toward a Better Understanding of Ripeness and Free Speech Claims

TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF RIPENESS
AND FREE SPEECH CLAIMS

Win. Grayson Lambert*
At first glance, ripeness is a simple concept. Yet, in its nuances, the doctrine
is complex and uncertain. One aspect of the doctrine that has gained a
consensus among courts and scholars is that, in free speech cases, the standard
ripeness test is relaxed. This relaxed standardis justified on the grounds that
free speech is critical to a democratic society and that courts cannotpermit any
potentialchilling effect on free speech to stand
Yet this lower ripeness standardfor free speech cases is not as sound as
courts and scholars believe, and this Article rejects the validity of this lower
standardas undeserved, unnecessary, and unclear. First,free speech cases do
not deserve a lower ripeness standard because such a standardsuggests that
other equally importantrights-includingthe right to befreefrom unreasonable
searches, the right to just compensation when the government takes one's
property, and the right to vote-are not as critical as the right to free speech.
Second, free speech cases do not need a lower ripeness standard because the
normal testfor ripeness, which looks to the fitness of the issuefor judicial review
and the hardship to the parties of withholding review, provides adequate
protectionfor anyone seeking to challenge a law under the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment. And third, even assuming that free speech cases
deserve and need a lower ripeness standard,the current doctrine lacks precision
regardinghow the standardshould be lowered. These three reasons lead to the
conclusion that the consensus on the lower ripeness standard for First
Amendment cases is not justified, and this Article calls for courts to apply the
standardripeness test to free speech cases.
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INTRODUCTION

First Amendment cases are often among the most captivating cases. The
public and legal scholars eagerly await judicial decisions in high profile First
Amendment cases. 2 In America's increasingly litigious society,3 some high
profile free speech case always seems to appear in the news.4
A fundamental principle of the federal courts is that they are courts of
limited jurisdiction, capable of exercising only the power granted to them by

1. Presumably, First Amendment cases attract attention for many reasons. My theory is that
Americans are interested in First Amendment cases because the First Amendment is championed as
one of the people's most fundamental rights, and the basic idea-freedom of speech-is relatively
accessible, even if the nuances of First Amendment jurisprudence are not.
2. Consider the media reaction to several of the most highly anticipated First Amendment
cases recently decided by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Citizens United Round-Up: Morning
Edition, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/citizens-united-roundup-morning-edition/ (providing links to reactions in the media after the Supreme Court decided
Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)); Adam Liptak, Justices Take

Up Funeral-ProtestCase, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, at A21 (discussing the arguments in Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011)).
3.
See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary
Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Court of Appeals, 81 GEO.

WASH. L. REv. 401, 407-09 (2013) (citing Carolyn Dineen King, Commentary, A Matter of
Conscious, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 955, 956-57 (1991); Charles Alan Wright, The Overloaded Fifth
Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L. REv. 949, 956-57 (1964); PAUL D.
CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 143-46 (1976)) (describing the rising caseload in federal
district courts); Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Unformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 321-22 (2011) (citing COMM'N ON
STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 14 tbl.2-3 (1998))
(describing the rising caseload of the federal circuit courts).
4.
See, e.g., Katherine Long, Court Rules for Free Speech in Former WSU Professor's
Lawsuit, SEATTLE TIES (Sept. 5, 2013), http:seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021764491
wsulawsuitxml.html (discussing a case dealing with a state university professor's free speech
rights).
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Article III of the Constitution. One jurisdictional requirement is ripeness, which
"is peculiarly a question of timing." 6 As one scholar notes, the ripeness
"doctrine seeks to separate matters that are premature for review because the
injury is speculative and never may occur, from those cases that are appropriate
for federal court action."7
Although the basic concept of ripeness is simple enough, the doctrine itself
"remains a confused mix of principle and pragmatic judgment."8 Ripeness has
been rooted in both Article III requirements and prudential considerations, yet
without a clear indication of what role these different considerations play.9 What
is clear-at least according to the consensus reached by the majority of federal
circuit courts-is that the ripeness standard is relaxed in the First Amendment
context. 10 Notably, however, the Supreme Court has never taken up this
question, and given the lack of a circuit split, the Court does not seem poised to
address this issue.11
Likewise, despite this consensus-or perhaps because of it-no scholar has
carefully considered whether the relaxed ripeness standard makes sense.12
Instead of offering careful analysis, existing scholarship generally accepts this
conclusion and offers the same justifications provided by courts, without delving
further into the issue.13 Therefore, this Article challenges the accepted, yet

5. See Lance v. Coffmnan, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam) ("Article III of the
Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies."'); see also Ry.
Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945) ("The conflicting contentions of the parties in this case
as to the validity of the state statute present a real, substantial controversy between parties having
adverse legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.").
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Reg'1 Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974)).
7.

ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92 (3d ed. 2009).

8. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th Cir. 1990).
9. See, e.g., Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)
("The ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from
prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509
U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993))).
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra notes 173-84 (discussing the federal courts of appeals that have upheld the
lower ripeness standard for free speech cases); see also Sindicato Puertorriqueno v. Fortuno, 699
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (discussing the relaxed ripeness standard and rejecting a defendant's
argument to add additional requirements).
12. At least one scholar has defended the relaxed standard, but this analysis only delves so
deep into the considerations that are fleshed out in this Article. See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3532.3,

at

515-534 (3d ed. 2012) (analyzing the need for the relaxed ripeness requirement for First
Amendment rights and arguing that other rights should also receive the special treatment).
13.

See, e.g., William Maker, Jr., What Do Grapes and FederalLawsuits Have in Common?

Both Must be Ripe, 74 ALB. L. REv. 819, 832 n.124 (2011) (citing Rivendell Winery, L.L.C. v.
Town of New Paltz, 725 F. Supp. 2d 311, 319 (N.D.N.Y. 2010); Dougherty v. Town of N.
Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2002)) (pointing out cases that quickly
accept the relaxed standard without questioning its validity).
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unexamined consensus, examining the soundness of lowering the ripeness
requirement in First Amendment cases.14
One important note should be made here: although courts typically describe
the lower ripeness standard as applying "in the First Amendment context,"15
what courts actually mean is that the standard applies to cases invoking the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 16 The First Amendment obvious
provides additional protections for religion, the press, petition, and assembly.
The lower ripeness standard does not appear to have been applied-at least not
with any frequency-to First Amendment cases invoking these other
protections.18 In this Article, I use the same vernacular as the courts, referring
often to First Amendment cases when the context is, more specifically, free
speech cases. At times, however, I use the term free speech cases; thus,
throughout the Article, First Amendment and free speech should be treated
synonymously-a use of terms that should not be confusing.
Ultimately, this Article rejects the relaxed ripeness standard on two grounds.
First, free speech rights do not deserve or need a relaxed ripeness standard. Free
speech rights do not deserve the lower standard because lowering the bar for a
ripe dispute only in First Amendment cases elevates these rights above other
constitutional guarantees. Although the First Amendment is important, other
constitutional rights also protect fundamental American values. Additionally,

14. The First Amendment obviously encompasses different rights-freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of petition. See U.S.
CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or of abridging the freedom of the speech, or of the press; or of
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."). Most of the cases involving ripeness invoke freedom of speech, but theoretically, the
analysis in this Article could apply to other First Amendment rights as well. See Geneva College v.
Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d. 402, 430 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (declining to draw a distinction between the
First Amendment rights a corporation has in the context of standing, stating "there is no contextual
distinction in the language of the First Amendment between freedom of speech and freedom to
exercise religion"), aff'd on reconsiderationin part, Memorandum Opinion and Order, No. 2:12-cy00207 (W.D. Pa. May, 8, 2013). See generally Steven J. Willis, Corporations,Taxes, andReligion:

The Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REv. 1, 16-23 (2013) (providing
an in-depth analysis of whether a corporation has standing to bring a freedom of religion action on
behalf its shareholders).
15. See, e.g., Dougherty, 282 F.3d at 90 ("In addition, in the [F]irst [A]mendment context,
the ripeness doctrine is somewhat relaxed."). On occasion, however, courts have been more
specific. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that "when
free speech is at issue, concerns over chilling effect call for a relaxation of ripeness requirements"
(citing El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 496 (1st Cir. 1992))).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech....").
17. Id. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
18. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 90
n.10 (1st Cir. 2013) (declining to resolve the question of whether the relaxed ripeness standard in
the First Amendment context applies to free exercise claims).
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First Amendment rights do not need a lower standard because the normal
ripeness analysis is sufficient to protect these rights. Second, even if First
Amendment rights may be considered worthy of greater protection than other
constitutional rights, the current consensus lacks precision in its language and
operation, thereby ignoring and potentially undermining the constitutional basis
of ripeness.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II offers an introductory discussion
of the ripeness doctrine. It starts by describing the test for determining whether a
case is ripe and then analyzes whether ripeness is a constitutional or prudential
doctrine, ultimately concluding that ripeness has a dual foundation based on both
the Constitution and prudential considerations.
Part III turns to ripeness in the context of First Amendment cases. Part III.A
describes the ways in which a plaintiff can style a First Amendment claim,
including an assertion of overbreadth, vagueness, or prior restraint; an as-applied
challenge; or a challenge to a law's neutrality. With this background, Part 111.13
examines the consensus that circuit courts have reached and the scholarly
recognition of this consensus; this examination is followed by a discussion of the
rationale for the relaxed ripeness standard offered by the courts.
Finally, Part IV explains why the lower ripeness standard is misguided,
despite the consensus it has attained. Part IV.A challenges the basic assumption
that First Amendment values are more important than other constitutional rights
such that they should be heard in federal court more readily than cases involving
other rights. It argues that First Amendment rights neither deserve nor need such
a standard. Additionally, Part IV.B shows that, even accepting the premise that
First Amendment cases should have a lower ripeness standard, the lower
ripeness standard is imprecisely defined and risks undermining the ripeness
doctrine more generally. Ultimately, this Article concludes that courts should
apply the same ripeness test in free speech cases that courts apply in all other
cases.
II. RIPENESS
Ripeness is the requirement that "a dispute has ... matured to a point that
warrants decision."1 9 As Professor Kenneth Culp Davis puts it, "The basic

19. Auto., Petroleum & Allied Indus. Emps. Union, Local 618 v. Gelco Corp., 758 F.2d
1272, 1275 (8th Cir. 1985); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (9th ed. 2009) (defining

ripeness as the requirement that a case "has reached, but has not passed, the point when the fact
have developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made").
Ripeness is closely related to other justiciability doctrines, particularly the doctrine of
standing. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009) (showing in the Table of Contents that the

ripeness doctrine is one section in the chapter on justiciability).
On the other hand, ripeness is distinguished from other justiciability doctrines in that "ripeness
is peculiarly a question of timing." See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 73 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Reg'l Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
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principle of ripeness is easy to state: Judicial machinery should be conserved for
problems which are real and present or imminent, not squandered on problems
which are abstract or hypothetical or remote." 20 The idea of ripeness is an old
concept in American law. In 1835, Chief Justice Marshall first used the word
"ripe" to describe a case as suitable for judicial decision in Life & Fire Insurance
Co. of New York v. Adams. Although the definition and concept of ripeness
seem simple enough, what exactly ripeness means in real cases is far more
complicated.22
This Part seeks to unpack the doctrine of ripeness. Part II.A describes the
two-prong test that the Supreme Court has established for determining when a
case is ripe. Part II.B then delves into the question of the basis for ripeness:
whether the requirement is constitutional or prudential.
A.

The Test

Whether a case is ripe for judicial review is determined by a two-pronged
test, which the Supreme Court established in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner2 3
in 1967; this test is now widely accepted by lower federal courts24 and scholars.25
The first prong analyzes "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision," and the
second prong examines "the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration." 26 In describing how this test is applied, the D.C. Circuit has
stated, "Like other legal inquiries, application of this test is by no means an exact

140 (1974)); see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (observing that "ripeness can be characterized as standing on a timeline").
Essentially, ripeness asks: "Is this the right time for the plaintiff to bring this case?" while standing
asks: "Is this the right plaintiff to bring this case?" See F. Andrew Hessick, ProbalisticStanding,
106 Nw. U. L. REv. 55, 63 (2012) (discussing the difference between ripeness and standing).
20.

Kenneth Culp Davis, Ripeness of GovernmentalAction for JudicialReview, 68 HARV. L.

REv. 1122, 1122 (1955).
21.

34 U.S. 573, 604 (1835).

22. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(noting that the test for ripeness "is by no means an exact science").
23. 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), abrogatedon other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.
99 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 280 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing
Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 148) (applying the two-pronged test from Abbott Laboratories);

Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 535 (1st Cir. 1995)) (stating that
questions of ripeness are gauged under the Abbott Laboratoriestwo-pronged test); United States v.
Shipley, 825 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (citing Droney v. Fitch, No. 4:10-CV-114,
2011 WL 890704, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 14, 2011)) (explaining the two-pronged analysis of
ripeness); Tait v. City of Philadelphia, 639 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149) (explaining that when applying the Abbott Laboratories twopronged test to determine whether a case is ripe, courts must "evaluate both the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration").
25. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
ConstitutionalLaw, 97 MIcH L. REv. 1, 168 & n.587 (1998) (citing Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S.

at 149) (discussing the two-pronged test from Abbott Laboratories).
26.

Id. at 168 (citingAbbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 149).
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science; nor is it to be a matter of weaving complicated legal distinctions
divorced from reality.

. .

. It requires, rather, the exercise of practical common

sense ... ."27
Generally, both of these prongs must be satisfied for a case to be ripe. 2 8
Although a plaintiff must show that both prongs are met, "a strong showing on
one may compensate for a weak one on the other." 29 Despite this prevailing
view, "[t]he relationship between these two parts of the test-fitness and
hardship-has never been precisely defined." 30 Supreme Court cases suggest
that the prevailing view is correct: the Court has refused to decide cases with
pure legal questions when the parties would face no hardship if the case was not
decided3313 and, likewise, has refused to decide cases lacking a clear dispute.32
These Supreme Court cases suggest that the argument from some scholars-such
as Professor Laurence Tribe -that only one prong is necessary for a case to be
ripe is not as strong as the position that the plaintiff must make at least some
showing on both prongs.34

27. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
28. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Both
prongs must be satisfied before an Article III court may apply its adjudicative powers to a case's
merits."); Prod. Credit Ass'n of N. Ohio v. Farm Credit Admin., 846 F.2d 373, 375 (6th Cir. 1988)
("For a claim to be ripe, both prongs of the ripeness test must be satisfied for us to exercise
jurisdiction.").
29. Mclnnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 2003). In another case, the
First Circuit suggested that a "weak" showing on one prong might be so weak as to be even
"questionable." See Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 535 (1st Cir.
1995) ("[W]e acknowledge the possibility that there may be some sort of sliding scale under which,
say, a very powerful exhibition of immediate hardship might compensate for questionable fitness
(such as a degree of imprecision in the factual circumstances surrounding the case), or vice versa.").
30.

Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 535.

31. See, e.g., Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961) (withholding adjudication because
the plaintiff challenged a criminal statute that had never been enforced).
32. See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320-23 (1991) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974); Rescue Army v. Mun. Ct. of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947); Babbitt v.
Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979); Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224
(1954)) (denying standing because the respondents failed to demonstrate a live dispute).
33.

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 80 (2d ed. 1988). The D.C.

Circuit appears to take an approach that could be consistent with Professor Tribe's view. Under
D.C. Circuit precedent:
[I]f the court has doubts about the fitness of the issue for judicial resolution, it will
balance the institutional interests in postponing review against the hardship to the parties
that will result from delay. Nonetheless, where .. . there are no significant agency or
judicial interests militating in favor of delay, lack of hardship cannot tip the balance
against judicial review.
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F.3d 459, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(citing Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 756-57 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations
marks and alterations omitted).
34. See, e.g., David Floren, Comment, Pre-enforcement Ripeness Doctrine: The Fitness of

Hardship, 80 OR. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2001) (citing TRIBE, supra note 33, at 80; ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
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1. Fitness of the Issue for JudicialReview
Under the first prong, a case is fit for judicial review when the parties
"present a real, substantial controversy [with] adverse legal interests ... ." The
parties have adverse legal interests when the parties have conflicting cognizable
legal claims. 36 These conflicting claims must be in a dispute that is concrete, not
merely "hypothetical or abstract."37
Some types of cases generally meet this fitness requirement. For example,
cases that present pure questions of law 38 are more likely to be ripe.39 The D.C.
Circuit has aptly explained why cases presenting pure legal questions are likely
ripe, writing that nothing more could happen that "would bring the issues into
greater focus or assist [a court] in determining them." 40 For instance, in Abbott

("Normally both fitness and hardship are necessary before a case is considered to be ripe.").
Ultimately, however, the resolution of this issue is not critical to the argument in this Article.
35. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (quoting Ry. Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945)). Put
another way, this prong is "the requirement that issues be sufficiently clarified before a court may
be expected to decide them." Davis, supra note 20, at 1134.
36. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-42 (1937) (citations
omitted) (holding that adverse legal interests existed when parties claimed opposing legal rights
under a contract).
37. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (quoting Corsi, 326 U.S. at 93). A seemingly obvious part of
this requirement-but a point worth making given the claims made by some plaintiffs-is that
dispute means the parties must actually disagree about the legal result of the issue in controversy.
When the parties agree on the outcome under the law, no dispute exists. See, e.g., Wis. Right to
Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183, 1185, 1187-88 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that no justiciable
case existed because the plaintiff and state officials all agreed that a Wisconsin law regulating
political action committees did not apply to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff could not face
prosecution under the law).
38. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001) (holding
that a case presents a question of law when the parties agree on the facts of the case but disagree on
the legal conclusion).
39. See, e.g., Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 10 of Cass Cnty., Mo. v. City of Peculiar, Mo.,
345 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2003) ("The case is more likely to be ripe if it poses a purely legal
question and is not contingent on future possibilities."); San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v.
Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82
F.3d 1431, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1996)) ("[P]ure legal questions that require little factual development
are more likely to be ripe."); see also Floren, supra note 34, at 1109 ("For issues raised in the
controversy to be fit for resolution by the court, they should be largely legal in nature and should
not require further factual development."). Floren discusses ripeness in the context of challenges to
agency action. See id at 1109-11 (citations omitted). Administrative law is, indeed, a common
area of law in which ripeness issues arise. See, e.g., Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of
Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-12 (2003) (citations omitted) (analyzing whether a controversy
concerning the validity of a federal management program for national parks was ripe for judicial
resolution). Nevertheless, ripeness is also an issue in many other areas of law, such as First
Amendment and civil rights claims. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[I]n the First Amendment context, the ripeness doctrine is
somewhat relaxed."); Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing
whether the plaintiffs civil rights claims concerning land use were ripe for adjudication).
40. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. v. Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding
that the plaintiffs challenge to an EPA regulation requiring the release of information about
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Laboratories,the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs challenge to a federal
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry was ripe for review.41 In that case, the
regulation had been promulgated, and the plaintiffs challenge focused on the
issue of whether the regulation was permissible under the underlying statute.42
The Court reasoned that the facts of the case were clear and nothing more was
necessary for the Court to be able to determine whether the regulation was
permissible under the statute.43
On the other hand, cases are unlikely to be fit for review when they present a
more complicated or undefined fact pattern that does not have a clearly
articulated dispute.44 For example, in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,45 the
Court held that the "ill defined controversies over constitutional issues"
prevented the case from being ripe.46 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged part
of the Hatch Act, 4 7 which prohibited federal employees from participating in
certain election activities. 48 The plaintiffs, however, had not demonstrated any
clear intent to participate in the prohibited election activities; rather, they had
only made general statements about their interest in participating in such
activities.49 Without a more complete factual record, the Court determined that
because it could not pass judgment on the validity of the Hatch Act as applied to
these plaintiffs, the case was not ripe. 0
A case may present a sufficiently concrete dispute to satisfy Article III's
requirements and, thus, be fit for judicial review, even if the plaintiff has not yet
had a law enforced against him, which is known as a preenforcement challenge

hazardous material needed no more factual development for the court to be able to resolve the
issue).
41. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 156 (1967).
42. See id. at 138-39 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(g)(1) (1966);
Drugs Labeling and Advertising, 28 Fed. Reg. 1448 (Feb. 8, 1963) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
1)).
43. See id. at 149.
44. See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320-23 (1991) (citing Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974);
Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954);
Rescue Army v. Mun. Ct. of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)) (holding that a challenge to a
California constitutional provision was not ripe because the factual record was "not clear" and the
impact of the provision upon the parties was uncertain).
45. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
46. See id. at 90-91. For a more thorough discussion of the facts of this case, see infra notes
98-105.
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (2006).
48. See id.; United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. at 81-82.
49. Id. at 87, n.18. The Court cited an affidavit filed by one of the plaintiffs showing the
general nature of his intent to engage in election activity, but lacking any specifics. See id.
50. See id. at 91. One plaintiff, George P. Poole, did present a ripe case. See id. Poole had
engaged in political activity in the past, and his allegations regarding Hatch Act violations of his
constitutional rights were specific enough to convince the Court that a concrete dispute existed. Id.
at 91-92 (citing Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); Atlvater v.
Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 364 (1943); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 260
(1932)).
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to a law.51 Despite a case's preenforcement nature, a plaintiff s case is ripe if the
plaintiff shows "an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected
with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and ... a credible threat
of prosecution thereunder." 52
A famous example of such a case is Steffel v. Thompson,53 in which Steffel
had been threatened with arrest-but not actually arrested-for distributing
handbills in protest of the Vietnam War.54 Steffel sued the state, seeking a
declaratory judgment that the law under which the state threatened prosecution
violated the First Amendment.
The Court held that, despite the lack of
prosecution, Steffel could challenge the law because he "demonstrate[d] a
genuine threat of enforcement." 56
Despite the "low threshold" for ripeness in preenforcement challenges,
some challenges fail to meet the applicable standard. For instance, in Alaska
Right to Life PoliticalAction Committee v. Feldman,ss the Ninth Circuit upheld
the district court's decision that the case was not ripe for prudential reasons. In
that case, a political action group challenged provisions in Alaska's judicial
ethics code in its effort to have judicial candidates respond to a questionnaire.60
Because no judge had answered the questionnaire, the Alaska Commission on
Judicial Conduct never undertook any review, and the Alaska Supreme Court
gave no indication that it would punish a judge who responded, the case was not
ripe-the issues were not fit for review and the plaintiffs could not show a
hardship.61
The exact line between what constitutes a credible threat of enforcement and
what does not is difficult to draw with precision, 62 but this line need not be

51. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139 (1967) (providing an example of a
preenforcement challenge).
52. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (citing Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)).
53. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
54. See id. at 455.
55. See id. at 454-55.
56. Id. at 475. Although Steffel is technically not a case about ripeness, it demonstrates that a
controversy exists when a plaintiff faces a credible threat of having a law enforced against him-a
requirement of a ripe case. Another famous case that demonstrates this credible threat of
enforcement-and that is often more associated with ripeness-is Babbitt v. United Farm Works
National Union, in which the Supreme Court held that some of the preenforcement challenges to a
state law regulating agricultural labor relations were justiciable and some were not, based on the
activities in which the plaintiffs had engaged or the activities that entailed a credible threat of
enforcement. 442 U.S. at 292, 299.
57. See N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1996).
58. 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007).
59. See id. at 849.
60. See id. at 843.
61. See id. at 849-53 (citations omitted).
62. This line has been a matter of debate among legal scholars for decades. See generally
Comment, Threat of Enforcement Prerequisite of a Justiciable Controversy, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
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delineated here.
Simply acknowledging the soundness of allowing
preenforcement challenges and noting that plaintiffs in preenforcement
challenges must meet the burden of showing a credible threat of enforcement is
sufficient for the purpose of this Article.
Declaratory judgments are closely related to preenforcement challenges;
indeed, these judgments are often the requested relief in preenforcement cases. 64
The authority to issue declaratory judgments "does not create a basis for federal
jurisdiction. Rather, jurisdiction must be established in accordance with Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution, and therefore, jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act requires an actual controversy between the parties." 6 5

106 (1962) (discussing the uncertainty surrounding what constitutes a threat of enforcement to
present a justiciable case in federal court in the mid-twentieth century).
Nevertheless, courts have provided some guidance regarding situations that sufficiently
demonstrate a credible threat. For example, "when dealing with pre-enforcement challenges to
recently enacted . .. statutes that facially restrict expressive activity by the class to which the
plaintiff belongs, courts will assume a credible threat of prosecution in the absence of compelling
contrary evidence." N.H. Right to Life PoliticalAction Comm., 99 F.3d at 15. Such compelling

contrary evidence includes instances when the government has interpreted a law such that the
conduct in which the plaintiff desires to engage does not violate the law. See Wis. Right to Life,
Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183, 1186 (7th Cir. 1998). Another type of compelling contrary
evidence arises when the government has explicitly stated that it will not prosecute the plaintiff for
its conduct. See Graham v. Butterworth, 5 F.3d 496, 499 (11th Cir. 1993). Compelling evidence
does not exist, however, when the government has only declined to enforce a statute. See Vt. Right
to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 375, 382 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that "nothing ... prevents
the State from changing its mind" in this situation). Nor does compelling evidence exist when the
government refuses to assure a plaintiff that the plaintiff would not be prosecuted under an allegedly
unconstitutional statute. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fla. Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1494 (11th Cir.
1993) (holding that a candidate for judicial office had a ripe case because the state bar had not given
the candidate a binding statement that the candidate's proposed campaign method would not violate
the code of ethics).
63. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis provides a powerful example of the soundness of
preenforcement challenges from the Jim Crow era:
Suppose that a shoe store owned and operated by Negroes is drawing business away from
shoe stores owned and operated by white people and that the legislative authority of the
southern city enacts an ordinance providing that any white person patronizing a Negro
shoe store shall be fined or imprisoned. Suppose that without any official action to carry
the ordinance into effect, nearly all whites, fearing possible prosecution, withdraw their
patronage from the Negro store. Is the ordinance ripe for challenge by the Negro owners?
The only sensible answer is that unless relief is to be denied for serious harm inflicted by
the unconstitutional ordinance, the Negro owners must be permitted to challenge the
ordinance as soon as a substantial amount of white patronage is withdrawn. If the impact
of a statute is to change the behavior of those who deal or may deal with the plaintiff, and
if the change causes substantial damage to the plaintiff, then the statute is ripe for
challenge by the plaintiff even though no prosecutor has threatened to enforce it and even
though an administrative agency which is empowered to carry out the statute has not yet
acted.
Davis, supranote 20, at 1136-37.
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244
(1937) (upholding the constitutionality of declaratory judgments).
65. Priority Healthcare Corp. v. Aetna Specialty Pharmacy, LLC, 590 F. Supp. 2d 663, 667
(D. Del. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127

Published by Scholar Commons, 2013

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
422

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65: 411

Thus, when a party seeks a declaratory judgment, that request still "must be
presented in the context of a specific live rievance."66 This requirement
prevents courts from issuing advisory opinions.
Preenforcement challenges and actions seeking a declaratory jud ment are
particularly relevant in the First Amendment ripeness context.
First
Amendment claims raising ripeness issues often involve challenges to a law that
allegedly violates a plaintiff s constitutional rights, in which the plaintiff asks the
court to strike down the law before the government enforces it against the
plaintiff.69 Plaintiffs in these cases must show a credible threat that the law will

(2007); EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1996), overruled in part on other
grounds, Medlmmune, Inc. v. Gentech, Inc. 549 U.S. 118 (2007)). But see generally Donald L.
Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the DeclaratoryJudgment Act Created
A Cause ofAction and ExpandedFederalJurisdictionWhile the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36

UCLA L. REv. 529 (1989) (arguing that the Declaratory Judgment Act has actually expanded
federal jurisdiction).
66. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 110 (1969). See generally Note, Declaratory
Judgments in ConstitutionalLitigation,51 HARv. L. REv. 1267 (1938) (discussing the reluctance by

the Supreme Court to hear actions seeking declaratory judgments on constitutional questions
without a concrete dispute between the parties).
67. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) ("As is well known, the
federal courts establishment pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory
opinions." (citing Ala. State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945); Alabama v.
Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 413 (1792) ; 3 THE
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, 1763-1826, at 486 (Henry P. Johnston ed.,
1971))). See generally Robert Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme CourtNever Gets Any "Dear John"
Letters: Advisory Opinions in HistoricalPerspective, 87 GEo. L.J. 473, 486-87 (1998) (discussing

Chief Justice Jay's refusal to give an advisory opinion to President Washington and the
constitutional basis of that decision).
Note that federal courts have even greater discretion in deciding whether to grant declaratory
relief than they do when a plaintiff seeks nondeclaratory relief. See generally Wilton v. Seven Falls
Co., 515 U.S. 277, 284, 286-87 (1995) (discussing the discretionary standard that applies to claims
seeking declaratory relief compared to claims for nondeclaratory relief, which federal courts have a
"virtually unflagging obligation" to hear (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); 28 U.S.C § 2201(a))).
68. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454-55 (1974) (discussing the ripeness of
the plaintiffs claim requesting declaratory judgment for a violation of First Amendment rights);
Navegar v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("A related component of
justiciability which is particularly relevant in the context of actions for preenforcement review of
statutes is 'ripeness,' which focuses on the timing of the action rather than on the parties seeking to
bring it.").
69. See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1988) (citing VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-390, 18.2-391 (2009)) (challenging a state law prohibiting the display of
sexually explicit material to children); New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d
1495, 1497 (10th Cir. 1995) (challenging a state law governing campaign finance).
Whether the statute imposes civil or criminal liability does not matter; what matters is that
there is a credible threat that the statute will be enforced against the plaintiff. See, e.g., Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152-53 (1967) (making no distinction between civil or criminal
penalties). As the Second Circuit noted, "[T]he fear of civil penalties can be as inhibiting of speech
as can trepidation in the fact of threatened criminal prosecution." Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v.
Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2000).
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be enforced against them to present a case that is fit for judicial review.70
Ultimately, the focus of this prong of the ripeness test is to ensure that the court
has a sufficiently developed dispute so that the court can accurately decide the
case. 71
2.

Hardshipto the Parties of Withholding Review

The second prong of the ripeness test examines whether the parties will face
some hardship if judicial decision is withheld.72 As the Tenth Circuit explained,
this prong "examine[s] whether the challenged action creates a direct and
immediate dilemma for the parties."73
Similar to the standard used in determining when a case is fit for judicial
review, the required showing that hardship to the parties would result from a
court withholding review lacks any precise definition.74 Still, courts have
developed some generally applicable principles. 75 For example, mere financial
loss is an insufficient hardship to warrant immediate review. Yet when a party
would experience financial loss and would have to change its behavior to comply
with the challenged law, the resulting hardship is sufficient grounds for
immediate review.77 In Abbott Laboratories, the Court noted that, for the
company to comply with the challenged regulation, it "must change all their
labels, advertisements, and promotional materials; ... must destroy stocks of
printed matter; and ... must invest heavily in new printing type and new

70. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'1 Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (citing Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)).
71. See Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 148 ("[lt is fair to say that its basic rationale is to
prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements .....
72.

See id. at 149.

73. Skull Valley Brand of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quoting New Mexicansfor Bill Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1499) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Note that the precedent on this issue in standing and ripeness cases can often overlap. See
Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Whether framed as an issue of
standing of ripeness, the inquiry is largely the same: whether the issues presented are 'definite and
concrete, not hypothetical or abstract."' (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n., 220
F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999))).
74. See Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1142 (citing Winter v. Cal. Med. Review, Inc., 900 F.2d 1322,
1324 (9th Cir. 1990)) (concluding that considerations of ripeness are based on the court's
discretion).
75. See, e.g., Dietary Supplemental Coal., Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1992)
("To meet the hardship requirement, a party must show that withholding judicial review would
result in direct and immediate hardship and would entail more than possible financial loss."
(quoting Winter, 900 F.2d at 1325)).
76. See id.

77. See, e.g., Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1238 (quoting Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians
v. Nielson, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1243 (D. Utah 2002)) (noting the "substantial costs" of
compliance, both monetary and other), affd, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004).
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supplies."
Because compliance would require all of these steps, the company
would have faced significant hardship if the case had not been decided at that
time.79 Without the compliance costs that directly affected the company's
business, the company would not have faced a hardship making judicial review
necessary at that time. 80
According to the Eleventh Circuit, "Potential litigants [also] suffer
substantial hardship if they are forced to choose between foregoing lawful
activity and risking substantial legal sanctions."8 1 This type of hardship exists
"when enforcement of a statute or regulation is inevitable and the sole
impediment to ripeness is simply a delay before the proceedings commence." 82
An example of such hardship may be found in Virginia v. American Booksellers
Ass 'n, Inc.,8 in which the Court held that a law "aimed directly at the plaintiffs"
forcing them to choose between "significant and costly compliance measures
or ... criminal prosecution" was a sufficient hardship to create a justiciable
case.84 Of course, whether an adequate hardship exists "depends on the
immediacy of the threat and the burden imposed on the petitioner. The
threatened harm must be immediate, direct, and significant."85
A case will not meet this standard, however, when the alleged injury is
merely "speculative." 86 For example, in Public Water Supply DistrictNo. 10 of
Cass County, Missouri v. City of Peculiar,Missouri,87 the Eighth Circuit held

that the water supply district's claim for declaratory relief was not ripe. In that
case, the water supply district sought a declaratory judgment that the city was
acting illegally under state law in its efforts to dissolve the district.89 The case
was not ripe because at the time the suit was filed, "no petition for dissolution

78. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
79. See id. at 152-53.
80. See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704
(2006)) (holding that the challenge to a law was not ripe because the compliance costs did not affect
"primary conduct," such as "when contracts must be negotiated, ingredients tested or substituted, or
special records compiled").
81. Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Presbytery of N.J. of
Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1468 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[flt is well established
that a case is ripe because of the substantial hardship to denying preenforcement review when a
person is forced to choose between forgoing possibly lawful activity and risking substantial
sanctions." (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION

§ 2.4, at

103 (1989))).

82. Kardules v. City of Columbus, 95 F.3d 1335, 1344 (6th Cir. 1996).
83. 484 U.S. 383 (1988).
84. Id. at 392.
85. Castellon-Gutierrez v. United States, 754 F. Supp. 2d 774, 777 n.7 (D. Md. 2010)
(quoting Charter Fed. Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F.2d 203, 208-09 (4th Cir.
1992); Pearson v. Leavitt, 189 F. App'x 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
86. See Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 10 of Cass Cnty., Mo. v. City of Peculiar, Mo., 345 F.3d
570, 573 (8th Cir. 2003).
87. 345 F.3d 570.
88. See id. at 573.
89. Seeidat571.
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[had] been filed, and it [was] not clear that a petition [would] ever be filed." 90
For instance, the water supply district offered no evidence that the city had a
petition with enough signatures to warrant submission to a state circuit court. 91
One last note about this prong of the ripeness test must be addressed: the
hardship to the parties is closely related to the credible threat of enforcement
aspect of the fitness prong, which ensures that the facts of the case are
sufficiently well-developed for judicial review.92 In First Amendment cases,
93
concerns about hardship and a credible threat of enforcement often overlap.
B.

The FoundationsofRipeness: Constitutionalor Prudential?
94

Having set forth the test courts apply to determine whether a case is ripe,
this Article now considers the basis for that test: Is it an Article III requirement
and, thus, a constitutional hurdle for plaintiffs? Or is it a prudential requirement
courts use to ensure that they decide only those cases that are sufficiently
concrete for accurate judicial resolution? This Article concludes that ripeness
has both a constitutional and prudential basis. 95 But the historical treatment of

90.

Id. at 573.

91. See id.
92. See id. at 573 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)) ("Whether a
case is 'fit' depends on whether it would benefit from further factual development.").
93. See, e.g., Dermer v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 599 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2010) ("While
'[h]ardship can sometimes be established if a plaintiff demonstrates that he would have to choose
between violating an allegedly unconstitutional statute or regulation and risking criminal or severe
civil sanctions . . . plaintiffs must still demonstrate a credible threat of prosecution.' . . . This

requirement is not satisfied if 'it would strain credulity to say that there is a credible threat that [a
plaintiffs] FirstAmendment rights will be violated in the future."' (quoting Elend v. Basham, 471
F.3d 1199, 1211 (11th Cir. 2006))).
94. This Article considers ripeness as a general doctrine-that is, as it is discussed in HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 19. This Article does not contemplate other specific ripeness doctrines,
such as the ripeness test for takings claims under the Fifth Amendment from Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985).

That doctrine is clearly prudential in nature, and it raises concerns that are distinct from those
discussed in this Article. For a thoughtful analysis of the Williamson County ripeness requirement,
consider the analysis of Judge Dennis W. Shedd in Sansotta v. Town ofNags Head, 724 F.3d 533,
544-49 (4th Cir. 2013).
95. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010)
("Ripeness reflects constitutional considerations that implicate Article III limitations on judicial
power, as well as prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." (quoting Reno v. Catholic
Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993))) (internal quotation marks omitted); Nat'l Park
Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) ("The ripeness doctrine is drawn
both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to
exercise jurisdiction ..... (quoting Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1,

11-12 (1995) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2) ("The ripeness doctrine is generally viewed as being
both constitutionally required and judicially prudent. The constitutional mandate results from
Article III's requirement that federal courts hear only cases or controversies. The prudential
restrictions result from the fact that most courts would rather avoid speculative cases, defer to
finders of fact with greater subject matter expertise, decide cases with fully-developed records, and
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ripeness is far from uniform, and the constitutional underpinnings of ripeness are
not universally accepted by legal scholars. 96
United Public Workers v. Mitchell7 is considered the starting point of

modem ripeness jurisprudence. 98 In that case, a number of federal employees
challenged the constitutionality of the Hatch Act's prohibitions on their political
activities. 99 In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court displayed an acute
awareness of the constitutional limits on its power. 100 Justice Reed, writing for
the Court, framed the issue as one of separation of powers. 101 He wrote that
"[t]he Constitution allots the nation's judicial power to the federal courts.
Unless these courts respect the limits of that unique authority, they intrude upon
powers vested in the legislative or executive branches."102 The Court focused on
ensuring more than a "hypothetical threat" of an injury that would force the
Court to "speculate" to render a decision. 103 Based on these principles, the Court
held that only one petitioner, George Poole, had a ripe case.
Poole admitted to
violating the Hatch Act in his allegations, whereas the other plaintiffs only
offered amorphous allegations that they "wish[ed] to engage" in political
activities, which the Court held were insufficient to present a ripe claim.1 5
The Court adopted a constitutional basis for the ripeness doctrine in
Mitchell.106 Justice Reed focused intensely on the constitutional requirements of
Article III, o0and by framing the Court's lack of power to hear the case as a
separation of powers issue, he undeniably tied this jurisdictional requirement to
the Constitution.108 The constitutional basis for ripeness in Mitchell was so clear

avoid overly broad opinions, even if these courts might constitutionally hear a dispute. The ripeness
doctrine, then, focuses both on whether an Article III case or controversy is present and on whether
it would be wise for the court to decide a dispute that may be premature.").
96. See infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
97. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
98. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 198.
99. See Mitchell, 330 US. at 81-82.
100. See id. at 90.
101. See id. at 78, 90-91.
102. Id. at 90.
103. See id
104. See id at 91-94 (citations omitted).
105. See id. at 87 n.18; see also id at 90 ("It would not accord with judicial responsibility to
adjudge, in a matter involving constitutionality, between the freedom of the individual and the
requirements of public order except when definite rights appear upon the one side and definite
prejudicial interferences upon the other.").
106. See id. at 89-90 (citations omitted) (focusing on the constitutional limits of their judicial
authority).
107. See id. at 89-91 (citations omitted).
108. See id. Of course, the Court in Mitchell never used the word ripe, or its variations, but
the basis of the decision rests on the plaintiffs' failure to take any action that could create a credible
threat of enforcement. See id. at 90 (concluding that "a hypothetical threat is not enough," when the
plaintiffs had not acted under the statute and, therefore, the statute had not been enforced against
them). Hart and Wechsler suggest that Mitchell was not ripe because the controversy was "too 'illdefined."' HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 205 (citing Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 90-91). That
suggestion stresses the same idea as the lack of credible enforcement allegation: both assertions
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that one scholar has called ripeness "a wholly constitutional doctrine" in its
"earliest stages." 109
Despite the constitutional focus in Mitchell, the Court explicitly adopted a
two-part test for ripeness in Abbott Laboratoriesthat seemed far more prudential
than constitutional; however, it also included the constitutional foundation from
Mitchell.110 Consider the test: the first part of the Abbott Laboratories test looks
to "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision.""'
A constitutional
requirement can plausibly be read into this prong.112 Judicial review is a term
that conjures notions of constitutional responsibility.113 Given the constitutional
moorings of this term,114 looking to the "fitness" of a case for judicial review
most logically means determining whether the issues presented are sufficient to
meet the constitutional requirements for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction
under Article 111.115 The Abbott Laboratoriestest thus includes the constitutional
basis for ripeness that the Court established in Mitchell.116

emphasize the lack of a concrete dispute.
analysis with ripeness analysis).

See id. (analogizing Mitchell's "ill-defined" dispute

109. See Jonathan D. Varat, Variable Justiciabilityand the Duke Power Case, 58 TEX. L. REV.

273,298 (1980).
110. For an early analysis of this case, see generally The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69,225-31 (1967) (citations omitted).

111. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
112. See Peter H.A. Lehner, Note, JudicialReview ofAdministrative Inaction, 83 COLuM. L.

REV. 627, 652 n.165 (citing Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148-54) (referencing Abbott
Laboratorieswhen stating that, to the extent the finality requirement involves the ripeness doctrine,
it may have a constitutional basis).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 404 n.3 (1990) (noting that
"respect for [the Court's] power of judicial review is a constitutional necessity in the ordinary
case"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability
and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 425 n.150

(1996) (noting the constitutional basis of judicial review, including how many Justices involved in
the Constitution's ratification viewed judicial review as rooted in the Constitution).
114. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (1803). Of course, although Marbury is often
viewed as establishing judicial review as a matter of constitutional law, many scholars view
Marbury as far more complex. Compare Orrin G. Hatch, Modern Marbury Myths, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 891, 892 (1989) ("The doctrine ofjudicial review articulated by Marburyv. Madison is indeed
the foundation of much constitutional law."), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the
ConstitutionalMind: A BicentennialEssay on the Wages of DoctrinalTension, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 4-8 (2003) (citing RITA L. ATKINSON ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 735 (11th ed.
1993); PETER GRAY, PSYCHOLOGY 520 (4th ed. 2002)) (arguing that Marbury establishes more

than just judicial review).
115. See, e.g., North v. Walsh, 656 F. Supp. 414, 418 (D.D.C. 1987) (commenting that the
court must first determine whether the claim is a justiciable case or controversy such that the court
has jurisdiction).
116. See, e.g., id. at 419 ("First, as a matter of constitutional importance, the Court must
evaluate 'the fitness of the issue for judicial review."' (quoting Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at
149)).
Still, some courts consider this prong a prudential requirement because the fitness assessment
does not entail an examination of whether the issues meet constitutional requirements; rather, it
entails an examination of whether the issues are appropriate for review at that time, given all of the
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But Abbott Laboratories went further. 117 The second prong-whether the
parties would face a "hardship" if the case were not decided -embraced a
prudential element that the Court had not fathomed in Mitchell.119 Although
requiring a party to face a certain level of hardship before it can file a justiciable
case in federal court might theoretically be a constitutional requirement, the
hardship requirement is more reasonably characterized as a prudential one.120
This aspect of the ripeness test "aims to improve the decisionmaking process and
to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources." 21 The prudential
requirement also gives a court more flexibility to avoid hearing cases for any
reason it sees fit, regardless of whether that reason is based in the
Constitution. 122
The view of the hardship requirement as a prudential one is confirmed by the
Court's decision in Abbott Laboratories.123 In that case, the Court focused on

facts. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 149) (adopting the view that the first prong of the Abbott
Laboratoriestest is prudential in nature). Even when courts take this view, they still note that
ripeness has a constitutional basis. See, e.g., id. at 1138 (discussing the "constitutional component"
of ripeness). Courts that take this view treat the constitutional basis of ripeness as synonymous with
the standing test because ripeness and standing are interrelated. See id. at 1138-39 (citing Erwin
Chemerinsky, A UnifiedApproach to Justiciability,22 CoNN. L. REv. 677, 681-82 (1990)). Thus,
despite treating the Abbott Laboratoriestest solely as a prudential standard, these courts recognize
that ripeness has a constitutional basis in addition to a prudential one. See id. Furthermore, given
how standing jurisprudence has shaped the ripeness doctrine, the analysis is ultimately rather
similar. See infra note 268. Finally, some courts treat both prongs of the Abbott Laboratoriestest
as relevant to both constitutional and prudential ripeness. See, e.g., Simmonds v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 326 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that the Abbott Laboratoriestest
is relevant for both constitutional and prudential ripeness).
117. Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 149.
118. See id.

119. Compare United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947), with Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148, 152 (comparing the discussion of ripeness in terms of advisory
opinions with a discussion of hardship as a constitutional requirement).
120. See Hessick, supra note 19, at 79-80; see also David S. Mendel, Note, Determining
Ripeness of Substantive Due Process Claims Brought by Landowners Against Local Governments,

95 MICH. L. REv. 492, 501 (1996) ("Courts may not consider the institutional benefits of
postponing judicial review in isolation from the actual harm that may be suffered by the
complainant.").
121. See Hessick, supra note 19, at 80.
122. Cf Mendel, supra note 120, at 500 ("These concerns are 'prudential,' because they are
not required by the Constitution; rather, courts invoke them at their own discretion.").
Ripeness is, thus, similar to standing in that the plaintiffs case could theoretically meet the
constitutional requirements for ripeness, yet the case could still be dismissed on prudential grounds.
See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) ("Even when a case
falls within these constitutional boundaries, a plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential
principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no
individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best
suited to assert a particular claim.").
123. See Mendel, supranote 120, at 501 (citing Abbott Laboratories,387 U.S. at 149) (noting
that Abbott Laboratories stands for the proposition that courts must balance prudential concerns
with the hardship to the parties of not deciding the case).
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the hardship that the petitioner would face if the case was not decided.124 For
instance, the Court noted that the petitioner would have to "change all [its]
labels, advertisements, and promotional materials; ... destroy stocks of printed
matter; and ... invest heavily in new printing tqe and new supplies." 1 25
Toilet Goods Association,Inc. v. Gardner,

a case decided on the same day

as Abbott Laboratories, provides further support for this interpretation of the
hardship requirement. In Toilet Goods, the Court noted that the agency action
was final and the issue presented was a purely legal question.127 Nevertheless,
the Court stated that "[t]hese points which support the appropriateness of judicial
resolution are ... outweighed by other considerations." 28
Those other
considerations were prudential, concerning the burden-or lack thereof-that the
petitioner would face if the case was not decided.129 For example, rather than
facing criminal penalties, the petitioner merely faced the prospect of "suspension
of certification services." 130 Taken together, Abbott Laboratories and Toilet
Goods indicate that the Court considers the hardship requirement to be a
prudential element in the ripeness test. 13 1
This injection of prudentialism is consistent with the increased focus on
prudential factors in judicial decisionmaking during the 1960s and 1970s.132 For
example, in addition to ripeness, the Warren Court focused on prudential factors
in developing standing doctrine,133 criminal procedure doctrines,134 and the

124. 387 U.S. at 152-53.
125. Id. at 152.
126. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967).
127. See id. at 162-63 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006)) (citing Frozen Foods Express v. United
States, 351 U.S. 40, 44-45 (1956); United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956);
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 423-24 (1942)).
128. Id. at 163.
129. See id. at 163-65 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704; Gardner, 387 U.S. at 171-73; Storer, 351 U.S.
at 205; Columbia Broad. Sys., 316 U.S. at 423-24)).
130. Id. at 165. For a classic example of prudential considerations, see Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Adler v. Bd. ofEduc., 342 U.S. 485, 497, 504 (1952), overruled in part by Keyishian v.

Bd. ofRegents ofthe State Univ. ofN Y, 385 U.S. 589, 595 (1967), in which he argued that the case
was not ripe because the facts were not sufficiently developed so as to present a clear indication of
the hardship faced by the plaintiff.
131. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the
Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 315, 318-19 (2001) (describing the Court's

shift in the 1970s from "flexible normative standards to hard and fast rules" in the context of
standing); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. Rev. 153, 153-54
(1987) ("For decades prior to the 1970s, principles of justiciability-standing, mootness, ripeness,
political questions, and the like-inhabited a hazy middle ground between prudential concern and
constitutional mandate.").
133. See generally Gilles, supra note 132, at 318 ("[P]rior to the 1970s, the Court resisted the
view that the standing requirement implicated separation of powers concerns. Instead, the Court
analyzed standing on a case-by-case basis, applying flexible and decidedly sub-constitutional
standards.").
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political question doctrine.135 This prudentialism remained part of the Burger
Court's jurisprudence during the 1970s as well. For example, in the 1978 case of
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,136 the Court

made a cursory observation that ripeness involves a "constitutional" aspect and,
subsequently, focused more on the prudential aspects of the doctrine, writing that
"[t]he prudential considerations embodied in the ripeness doctrine also argue
strongly for a prompt resolution of the claims presented."1 37 This case
demonstrated the Court's explicit shift in recognizing that ripeness is not solely a
constitutional doctrine. 138
Despite this focus on prudentialism, the Court returned to emphasizing the
constitutional basis of ripeness in Babbitt v. United Farm Works National

Union.139 In that case, the plaintiffs brought a preenforcement challenge to
Arizona's farm labor statute. In holding that the case was not ripe as to two of
the five challenged provisions,141 the Court explicitly framed the justiciability
question as a "threshold" matter based on "Art. III of the Constitution." 14 2 In
fact, the Court focused so heavily on the constitutional basis of ripeness that it
never even mentioned Abbott Laboratories or the two-pronged test from that
case.143 Instead, the Court focused on "whether the conflicting contentions of
the parties ... present[ed] a real, substantial controversy between parties having
adverse legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or
abstract.
In holding that challenges to two of the statute's provisions were
not ripe, the Court noted that it could "only hypothesize" whether the employers

134. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2273 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
486, 444-45 (1966)) (calling the rules from Miranda"prophylactic").
135. See, eg, Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 263-73 (2002)

(citations omitted) (describing the Warren Court's use of prudential considerations to limit the
political question doctrine); Michael J. Gerhardt, Essay, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L REv. 1204,
1212 (2006) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962)) (noting that the Court focused on
"prudential criteria" for the political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr).
136. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
137. Id. at 80-81.
138. See id.

139. 442 U.S. 289 (1979). Although the Court never actually used any form of the word
ripeness in Babbitt, the case is widely considered to be part of the Court's ripeness jurisprudence.
See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 210 (citing Babbitt in a discussion of whether

ripeness is constitutional or prudential for the proposition that the ripeness doctrine is frequently
associated with Article III's case and controversy requirement).
140. See Babbitt,442 U.S. at 292.
141. See id.

142. See id. at 297.
143. See id. at 289.
144. Id. at 298 (quoting Ry. Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Although this language is not identical to the first prong of the Abbott Laboratories
test, it examines similar aspects of a case, lending further support to the argument that the first
prong of the test is more constitutional than prudential. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying
text.
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would undertake the allegedly unconstitutional act of forcing employees to
furnish information about the labor organization or whether the employers would
force the employees to arbitrate disputes, making any opinion "patently

advisory."1 4 5
In the decades since the Court reaffirmed the constitutional basis of ripeness
in Babbitt, the Court has still clung to the Abbott Laboratories framework for
ripeness analysis, despite its failure to employ that framework in Babbitt itself.
In Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., for instance, the Court used the twopronged test to decide that the plaintiffs challenge to a regulation promulgated
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service was not ripe.147 In that case, the
Court emphasized the prudential aspect of the test. 48 But even while
emphasizing the prudential aspect of ripeness in some cases, the Court has not
strayed from its position that ripeness is firmly grounded in the Constitution.149
For example, while focusing its analysis on the hardship prong in National Park
Hospitality Association v.

Department of the

Interior,so the

Court

unambiguously noted that ripeness is a constitutional requirement."5 Thus, the
Supreme Court has established that ripeness has a dual foundation: the
Constitution and prudentialism. 152
This dual foundation for ripeness is widely recognized by courts 153 and
scholars. 154 The First Circuit has described ripeness as a doctrine that "mixes

145. Id. at 304.
146. 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
147. See id. at 57-59 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 57 n.18 (citing Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974));
see also Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-37 (1998) (citations omitted)
(focusing on the hardship prong-that is, the prudential aspect-of the ripeness test in holding that
the case was not ripe).
149. See, e.g., Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)
(quoting Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18).
150. 538 U.S. 803.
151. See id. at 808 ("The ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on
judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." (quoting Reno, 509
U.S. at 57 n.18)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. The Court has recognized that these foundations are in fact distinct justifications for
ripeness and provide separate hurdles that plaintiffs must overcome to have their cases heard in
federal court. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976) (per curiam) ("We have recently
recognized the distinction between jurisdictional limitations imposed by Art. III and '[p]roblems of
prematurity and abstractness' that may prevent adjudication in all but the exceptional case."
(quoting Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972))).
153. See, e.g., In re Coleman, 560 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Ripeness has two
components: constitutional ripeness and prudential ripeness." (citing Thomas v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc))); Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("[A]n Article III court cannot entertain the claims of
a litigant unless they are 'constitutionally and prudentially ripe."' (quoting La. Envtl. Action
Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1381 (1996))).
154. See, e.g., Robert Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
FunctionsofFederal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAVE L. REv. 447, 455-56 (1994) (discussing the basis of
ripeness); Joan Steinman, Shining A Light in A Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the Right to
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various mutually reinforcing constitutional and prudential considerations."s
Some scholars, however, have ex ressed concern about the dueling
considerations underlying the doctrine.
Professor Gene Nichol describes the
constitutionalization of ripeness as "troubling."157
He argues that this
constitutionalization is "[n]ot only ... inconsistent with the doctrine's premises,
but it implies a rigidity and formalism that are at odds with the doctrine's
operation. It threatens further to complicate and confuse the case or controversy
requirement as well."158 According to Professor Nichol, ripeness ultimately has
"little in common with Article III jurisprudence."1 59 Professor Robert Pushaw
takes a similarly dim view of the constitutionalization of ripeness.160 Professor
Pushaw contends that cases and controversies are not synonymous.161 Cases
deal with federal question matters, including claims arising under the
Constitution, such as First Amendment claims.162 Professor Pushaw argues that
when deciding cases rather than controversies, judges should have broader
authority to declare the law.163 He claims that ripeness should not be an Article

DefendA Judgment in the FederalCourts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 859 (2004) (noting that ripeness has
constitutional and prudential considerations); Nichol, supra note 132, at 161-163 (citing Babbitt v.
Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433 (1975); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458 (1974); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); 4
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25:6, at 370 (1983)) (noting the
constitutional and prudential foundations of ripeness); Stein, supra note 95, at 6 ("Ripeness is a
jurisdictional matter arising under Article III of the United States Constitution that also raises
substantial questions of judicial prudence, forcing a federal court to decide whether it can and
should hear each case."); see also 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 90 (2012) (stating that the ripeness
doctrine has "roots in both the Article III case or controversy requirement and in prudential
considerations" (quoting Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 59 (1st Cir. 2003))) (internal
quotation marks omitted); WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER supra note 12,

§ 3532.1,

at 375, 378-79

(noting both the constitutional and prudential basis of ripeness).
155. Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 138 (1st Cir. 2003).
156. See Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (3d Cir. 1993) ("We
recognize '[t]here is some disagreement among courts and commentators as to whether the ripeness
doctrine is grounded in the case or controversy requirement or is better characterized as a prudential
limitation on federal jurisdiction."' (quoting Armstrong World Indus. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 411
n.12 (3d Cir.1992))). The Third Circuit noted that courts have disagreed over the foundation of
ripeness-its basis for this statement was the Supreme Court's apparent flip-flop between focusing
on ripeness as constitutional or prudential. Although the Court's focus has shifted in various cases,
its underlying perspective that ripeness is both prudential and constitutional has remained constant
for several decades. See supra notes 146-153 and accompanying text. Therefore, the real
disagreement about the propriety of the dual basis of ripeness is among scholars, not courts.
157. Nichol, supra note 132, at 163 (citing Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 297).
158. Id. at 156.
159. Id.
160. See generally Pushaw, supra note 154, at 529 (discussing Professor Nichol's argument
that the cases or controversy requirement cannot be applied to ripeness).
161. See id. at 448-49.
162. See id. at 449.
163. See id. at 472-76, 496-97 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819
(1824); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 103, 430 (1911)).
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III requirement for constitutional cases because ripeness "demands a prudential
evaluation of the substantive legal claim." 164
Ultimately, scholars' discomfort with the constitutionalization of ripeness
seems to be rooted in their belief that ripeness "turns on one's conception not of
[A]rticle III, but of the substantive interests asserted."1 65 Professor Akhil Reed
Amar illustrates this point with a First Amendment example:
A [F]irst [A]mendment absolutist like Hugo Black and a balancer
like Felix Frankfurter will predictably disagree about whether a given
anticipatory challenge to a law allowing prior restraint in certain
specified circumstances is ripe because the absolutist deems various
facts that have not yet materialized irrelevant-prior restraint is always
impermissible-whereas a balancer might find those facts dispositive.
But this is a disagreement about the meaning of the [F]irst
[A]mendment, and not about [A]rticle 111.166
This concern demonstrates that ripeness "involves difficult questions of
judgment and degree." 67 In the minds of these scholars, the minute degrees that
govern ripeness analysis are not matters related to Article III, but rather are
merely prudential considerations. 168
Nevertheless, the Court has embraced a constitutional basis for ripeness, a
position from which the Court has given no indication that it will waiver.169 For
the foreseeable future, therefore, plaintiffs must satisfy both constitutional and
prudential requirements for federal courts to consider their claims.170 Similarly,
scholars must analyze ripeness within this dual-foundational framework.

164. Id. at 529.

165. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REv. 688, 718 n.155 (1989) (book review);
see also Pushaw, supra note 154, at 529 (discussing the discretionary aspect of the ripeness doctrine
before its "constitutionalization").
166. Amar, supra note 165, at 718 n.155.
167. C. Douglas Floyd, The JusticiabilityDecisions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L.

REv. 862, 935 (1985); see also NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333,
341 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Ripeness is a matter of degree whose threshold is notoriously hard to
pinpoint.").
168. See, e.g., Mendel, supra note 120, at 500 ("These concerns are 'prudential,' because they
are not required by the Constitution; rather, courts invoke them at their own discretion."). This
Article makes no judgment on the wisdom of ripeness's constitutional basis. I simply highlighted
this academic objection to provide a more robust discussion of the basis of ripeness and will address
this question at another time.
169. See supra note 139.

170. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (citing Reg'l
Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974)) (explaining that even if the parties do not
raise the prudential consideration, a court can raise it on its own).
171. Cf Levy, JudicialAttention as a Scarce Resource, supra note 3, at 404-05 (arguing that

considerations about how the courts of appeals should allocate resources must be made within the
existing resource constraints because those constraints are unlikely to change in the near future).
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Thus, the discussion of ripeness and First Amendment claims must be
undertaken in the context of ripeness's prudential and constitutional bases. 172
III. THE PREVAILING VIEW OF RIPENESS AND FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS
Having set forth the basic test for ripeness and its foundation in Part II, this
Part turns to ripeness in the context of First Amendment claims. It examines the
most common types of First Amendment challenges in Part III.A before focusing
on what courts and scholars have said about the ripeness of these challenges in
Part IIJ.B.
A.

Types ofFirstAmendment Claims

A law may be challenged on First Amendment grounds under various
theories, such as overbreadth, vagueness, prior restraint,173 and as-applied.174
The first three types of claims are generally made as facial challenges, meaning
they allege that the law will often be unconstitutional when applied.175 Proving
that a law is facially unconstitutional is a high hurdle to overcome,176 and such
challenges are generally disfavored 77-although that disfavor is not quite as
strong in the First Amendment context.
The last type of claim, an as-applied
challenge, alleges that the law is only unconstitutional as applied in a specific
context. 17 9 A fifth type of First Amendment claim that cannot be characterized
as a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge is a claim that a law

172. See supra Part I.B.
173. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 1247, 1254 (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 559 (1976); N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)).
174. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1321, 1321 (2000).
175. A plaintiff can, however, bring an as-applied challenge on both vagueness and prior
restraint grounds. See, e.g., Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421,
437 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting an as-applied prior restraint challenge); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d
470, 486 (2d Cir. 2006) (analyzing an as-applied vagueness challenge under a two-part test of (1)
whether the law gave a reasonable person notice of what conduct was prohibited and (2) whether
the law provides explicit standards for its application (quoting United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548,
550 (2d Cir. 1993))). Despite this exception, these three types of challenges are best thought of as
facial challenges because that is the context in which they are most common. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 7, at 1247 ("Laws ... can be challenged as facially unconstitutional on the grounds that
they are unduly vague and overbroad.").
176. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge ... is,
of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.").
177. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (stating
that "[flacial challenges are disfavored").
178. See S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson Cnty., Or., 372 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Courts
generally disfavor facial challenges to legislation, although this reluctance is somewhat relaxed in
the First Amendment context.").
179. See Fallon, supra note 174, at 1321.
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discriminates against a particular type of speech.1so Although the type of First
Amendment claim depends on the particular law at issue and the particular facts
of each case, a basic understanding of the framework involved in each type of
claim is useful for fully grasping the concept of ripeness in First Amendment
cases. 181
A plaintiff brings an overbreadthl82 challenge when the plaintiff alleges that
a law "regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution allows to be
regulated and a person to whom the law constitutionally can be applied can
argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied to others."1 83 The doctrine of
overbreadth is grounded largely on the idea that allowing such challenges will
protect speech from any chilling effect created by the allegedly overbroad law. 184
An overbreadth claim is necessarily a facial challenge to a law because if the
claim succeeds, the court will hold that the law must be struck down.Iss An
overbroad law may be struck down based on its application to a hypothetical
third party; a laintiff need not show that the law has actually been applied in
that context.
As the Eighth Circuit succinctly articulated this point, "[T]o
prevail, a plaintiff must show the challenged law either could never be applied in
a valid manner or it is written so broadly that [it] may inhibit the constitutionally
protected speech of third parties.
Because a successful overbreadth challenge

180. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 1214 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,

505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)) ("The Court stated: '[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter
or its content."' (quoting Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972))).
181. Although one cannot draw perfectly neat lines between facial and as-applied challenges,
the general framework is still useful for considering how First Amendment claims can be styled.
See generallyFallon, supra note 174 (discussing the lack of clarity regarding the way in which First
Amendment cases are brought).
182. The doctrine was conceived in its current vernacular by Professor Lewis Sargentich. See
Note, The FirstAmendment OverbreadthDoctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 846 (1970) [hereinafter
Sargentich Note]; see also Katharine Malone, Note, Parody or Identity Theft: The High-Wire Act of
Digital Doppelgangers in Cahfornia, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 275, 280 n.23 (2012)

(observing that Lewis Sargentich named the overbreadth doctrine in his famous note).
183. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 1249.

184. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (reasoning that overbreadth
challenges are permissible because a "statute's very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression"); see also New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 767-69 (1982) (citations omitted) (discussing the overbreadth doctrine); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 854-57 (1991) (citing Massachusetts
v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989)) (describing the rationale of the overbreadth doctrine).
185. See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 498 (2d Cir. 2006) ("All overbreadth challenges
are facial challenges, because an overbreadth challenge by its nature assumes that the measure is
constitutional as applied to the party before the court.").
186. See Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612-13; United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292-93 (2008))
(discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
187. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685, 692 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting City Council of L.A.
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled
by Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, Mo., 697 F.3d 678, 692 (8th Cir. 2012).
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results in a law being struck down entirely,188 the Supreme Court has called it a
"strong medicine,"
and, if possible, courts generally take care to adopt a
"limiting construction" to avoid striking down the entire law. 190
A vagueness claim is also a facial challenge to a law.191 Prohibiting vague
laws ensures that the government does not "inhibit the exercise of [First
Amendment] freedoms" by leaving citizens unsure of whether the exercise of
those freedoms is lawful. 2 The doctrine also protects against "arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement" of the law.193 If a law leaves people "of common
intelligence . . . guess[ing] at its meaning," the law is unconstitutionally
vague. 94 Although courts consider vagueness and overbreadth separate bases

for challenging a law,195 Some scholars, such as Professor Richard Fallon, argue
that vagueness is "best conceptualized as a subpart of First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine."1 96 Even if vagueness should be merely a subset of the
overbreadth doctrine, courts have developed a sufficiently detailed vagueness
jurisprudence that allows plaintiffs to style their challenges to a law under either
vagueness or overbreadth. 97

188. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464, 482 (2010) (striking down a statute
forbidding the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty as
overbroad).
189. Broadrick,413 U.S. at 613.
190. See Giovani Carandola, Inc. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615). Concededly, this discussion of overbreadth challenges is
incredibly cursory. For a more detailed discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 168-74 (citations omitted). And for an even more in-depth discussion
of the nuances and uncertainties in the doctrine, see generally Fallon, supra note 184, at 854-57
(citing Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989)) (describing the rationale of the overbreadth
doctrine).
191. See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 485, 495-96 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that a
vagueness challenge is a facial attack on a law).
192. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (quoting Cramp v. Bd. of Pub.
Inst. of Orange Cnty., 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
Vague laws also implicate due process concerns because vague laws prevent a person from
"steer[ing] between lawful and unlawful conduct." See id. at 108.
193. City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (Stevens, J., plurality).
194. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing Collins v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 634, 638 (1914); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914)).
195. See, e.g., Farrell, 449 F.3d at 498-99 ("Overbreadth and vagueness are different
doctrines. A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits
constitutionally protected conduct." (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
196. Fallon, supra note 184, at 904; see also Floyd, supra note 167, at 902-03 (quoting Coates
v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)) (citing id. at 617 (Black, J., dissenting in part); id.
at 618 (White, J., dissenting)) (discussing vagueness challenges in the section on overbreadth
challenges); Sargentich Note, supra note 182, at 873 (observing that "the doctrines of vagueness
and overbreadth are not entirely distinct" and that "[t]he vagueness doctrine ... has been almost
wholly merged with the overbreadth doctrine when statutes covering [F]irst [A]mendment activities
are at issue").
197. See, e.g., Farrell, 449 F.3d at 484-85, 498-99 (citations omitted) (recognizing that
vagueness and overbreadth challenges are different claims despite having similar analyses).
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The third type of facial challenge is a claim that a law imposes a prior
restraint on speech. 198 A law acts as a prior restraint if it is "[a] governmental
restriction on speech or publication before its actual expression." 199 The
Supreme Court has held that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." 200
Prior restraints thus "require an unusually heavy justification under the First
Amendment." 2 0 1 Just as laws that are overbroad or vague violate the First
Amendment, laws that operate as prior restraints will almost always fail to pass
constitutional muster.202
Unlike the three types of facial challenges, an as-applied challenge does not
ask a court to strike down an entire law; rather, it asks a court to declare that the
law is unconstitutional as applied to a particular case. 203 Thus, if the plaintiff
prevails, the law is still valid, but it cannot be applied in that case.
This
category of First Amendment challenge is often considered a residual categor7 ,
encompassing all those claims that do not seek the total invalidation of a law.20
The last type of First Amendment claim involves a claim that a law
discriminates against a particular type of speech. 206 Depending on the type of
forum,207 a law cannot discriminate based on content20 or viewpoint.20 This

198. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 335 (2010) (treating a
challenge to an election law as a prior restraint on speech as a facial challenge).
199. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1314 (9th ed. 2009).

200. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
201. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
202. See id at 717 ("Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view
that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship,
injunctions, or prior restraints."). For several thoughtful treatments of this doctrine that include
discussions of its foundations and challenges to the manner in which it is often applied, see
generally Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539 (1977)
(challenging how the doctrine is applied); Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 20
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955) (addressing the foundations of prior restraints); John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983) (examining the role and
addressing the application of the doctrine).
203. See, e.g., Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) ("An as-applied
challenge contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the litigant's particular speech
activity, even though the law may be capable of valid application to others .... A successful asapplied challenge does not render the law itself invalid but only the particular application of the
law.").
204. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007)
(holding that § 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (2002), could not constitutionally be applied to a political action group).
205. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About FacialChallenges,99 CALIF. L. REV.
915, 924 (2011) (noting that the common perception of as-applied challenges as a residual category
is an unfortunate occurrence because of the resulting imprecision in terminology).
206. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supranote 7, at 1214 ("The Court stated: '[A]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content."' (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382 (1992))).
207. First Amendment law recognizes three types of fora: public fora, designated public fora,
and nonpublic fora. See Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074-78 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
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type of discrimination claim can be either a facial challenge210 or an as-applied
challenge.2 11
Ultimately, this system of classification for First Amendment claims is
imperfect.212 Yet it is the framework that exists, so it is the framework in which
the analysis must take place. Although the question of whether a First
Amendment claim is ripe does not necessarily depend on the type of

and citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797, 800, 802, 80405 (1985); Diloreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 964-65 & n.4, 968
(9th Cir. 1999); Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 244, 250-55
(3d Cir. 1998); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Chi. Area v. Chi. Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1232
(7th Cir. 1985); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 575 (9th Cir. 1984)).
In describing fora, some courts have used the term limited publicforum as a synonym for a
designated public forum, while others have used it as a synonym for a nonpublic forum. See, e.g.,
Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975-76 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp.
Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004); Make The Rd. by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133,
139 (2d Cir. 2004); Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1553 n.10 (8th Cir. 1995)) (citing
examples of the different uses of "limited public forum"). The proper use of limitedpublicforum is
not important here.
208. A content-based restriction on speech is not permitted in a public forum. See, e.g.,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting
bias-motivated disorderly conduct was unconstitutional because it was not content-neutral). To be
constitutional in a public or designated public forum, a content-neutral restriction of the time, place,
or manner of speech must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Consol. Edison Co. v Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
209. A viewpoint-based restriction on speech is not permitted in a nonpublic forum. See, e.g.,
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995) (holding that
denying funds to a Christian student newspaper was unconstitutional because the denial was based
on the group's religious perspective). A viewpoint-neutral restriction in a nonpublic forum is
constitutional if the restriction is reasonable. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (quoting Perry Educ.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).

The Court has recognized that viewpoint discrimination is simply an "egregious form of
content discrimination." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. The line between these forms of
discrimination may be difficult to discern; however, depending on the type of forum, that line can
be the difference between a constitutional and an unconstitutional law.
210. See, e.g., Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566, 574 (7th Cir.
2002) (noting that the plaintiffs brought a facial challenge to a university's use of mandatory student
activity fees).
211. See, e.g., Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(treating the plaintiffs' challenge to a regulation regarding national cemeteries as an as-applied
challenge).
212. See, e.g., Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 659 (2010) (arguing that "important questions remain unanswered because
categorizing constitutional cases into 'facial' and 'as-applied' challenges, and relying on these
categories to shape doctrine and inform case outcomes, is an inherently flawed and fundamentally
incoherent undertaking").
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challenge,213 understanding these various types of challenges is useful in
thinking about ripeness and free speech cases because this understanding should
remove any potential confusion about the nature of the challenge to a law.
B. The Prevailing View ofRipeness and FirstAmendment Claims

With this basic understanding of free speech cases, this Part now focuses on
how the federal circuit courts have treated ripeness in First Amendment cases.
Generally, a consensus exists among these courts that the ripeness requirement
should be relaxed in the context of First Amendment cases.214 Part II.B
discusses this consensus, highlighting several cases as examples of how this
approach works in practice, and concludes by delving into the rationale for this
consensus.
1.

The Consensus on Ripeness and the FirstAmendment

Not all federal circuit courts have expressly addressed ripeness in the First
Amendment context; however, courts that have done so have reached the same
conclusion: the ripeness requirements are lowered in cases involving a free
speech claim.
Of the federal courts of appeals, only the Fifth, Eighth, and Federal Circuits
appear not to have had an occasion to decide which ripeness standard applies in
First Amendment cases. Every other circuit has decided, when presented with
the opportunity, that the ripeness standard is lowered when a case involves free
speech, showing that "[c]ourts have been readily willing to find First
Amendment freedom of speech issues ripe for review." 2 15 For instance, the First
Circuit held that "when free speech is at issue, concerns over [a] chilling effect
call for a relaxation of ripeness requirements." 216 The Second Circuit wrote that,
"in the First Amendment context, the ripeness doctrine is somewhat relaxed." 217
The Third Circuit agreed with this view, holding that "[a] First Amendment
claim ... is subject to a relaxed ripeness standard." 218 Similarly, the Fourth

213. Of course, an as-applied challenge is more likely to be ripe because the facts of such a
case are likely to be more developed than the facts of a facial challenge. See Renne v. Geary, 501
U.S. 312, 320 (1991) (noting the need for a live controversy and particularized claim). Such is not
always the case, however. See Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 438 (3d Cir. 2003)
(concluding that the plaintiffs facial First Amendment challenge was ripe).
214. See cases cited infra notes 207-16.
215. Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of
ConstitutionallyProtectedPropertyRights, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 8 (1992).

216. Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing El Dia, Inc. v.
Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 496 (1st Cir. 1992)).
217. Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.
2002).
218. Peachlum v. City of York, Pa., 333 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Dougherty, 282
F.3d at 90).
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Circuit held that "the ripeness analysis is often relaxed in First Amendment
cases." 219 The Sixth Circuit used virtually identical language when it stated that
the ripeness standard is "relaxed in the First Amendment context."220 The
Seventh Circuit took the same position, holding that "[r]equirements of ripeness
are less strictly construed in the [F]irst [A]mendment context." 2 2 1 Likewise, the
Ninth Circuit observed that ripeness is applied "less stringently in the context of
First Amendment claims."222 The Tenth Circuit agreed that "[t]he customary
ripeness analysis ... is ... relaxed somewhat" when free speech rights are
involved. 223 The Eleventh Circuit used different language but made the same
point, holding that, "[i]n First Amendment cases, [the ripeness] test is less
exacting." 22 4 Finally, the D.C. Circuit held that, in First Amendment cases, "the
ripeness doctrine has been more loosely applied." 22 5
Several cases illustrate this lower ripeness standard, such as the New
Mexicansfor Bill Richardson v. Gonzales22 case from the Tenth Circuit. In that
case, the plaintiffs, Congressman Bill Richardson and his campaign committee,
challenged a state election law that prohibited contributions to federal campaigns
from being used in state elections.
Congressman Richardson had $500,000 on
hand, which had been raised during his campaigns for Congress; he and his
committee challenged the state law when he was considering running for state
office.228 Richardson claimed that because the funds were not raised with any

219. Donnangelo v. Myers, 187 F.3d 629, 1999 WL 565834, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1999)
(unpublished table decision). Notably, as an unpublished opinion, this decision is not binding
precedent.
220. Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Marchi v. Bd. of Coop.
Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d 469, 479 (2d Cir. 1999)).
221. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Chi. Area v. Kempiners, 700 F.2d 1115, 1122 (7th Cir.
1983).
222. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Cal. Pro-Life Council,
Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003)).
223. New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995).
224. Fla. Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar, 273 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Digital
Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1997)).
225. Martin Tractor Co. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 627 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
226. 64 F.3d 1495. This case is a particularly appropriate example because many cases from
other circuits cite New Mexicans for Bill Richardson as the basis for the lower ripeness bar in First
Amendment cases. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting
New Mexicans for Bill Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1499) (discussing the ripeness of a claim);
Donnangelo v. Myers, 187 F.3d 629, 1999 WL 565834, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1999) (unpublished
table decision) (explaining the ripeness of a case)).
227. New Mexicans for Bill Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1497 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-1929.1B (2012)).
228. Id. Although Richardson did not run for state office in the 1990s at the time of this suit,
he eventually ran for Governor, serving two terms from 2003 to 2010. Archives and Historical
Servs. Div., New Mexico Governors, N.M. COMM'N OF PUB. RECORDS, http://www.nmcpr.

state.nm.us/archives/governors.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). In the years between this suit and
his time as governor, Richardson served as Secretary of Energy in the Clinton Administration. See
U.S. Dep't of Energy, Secretariesof Energy, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/management/history/

secretaries-energy (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
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promises or indications that the money would be used only for federal elections,
the $500,000 could be used in a campaign for state office. 29 At the time of the
suit, Richardson had not indicated that he was planning to run for any state
office, so the district court held the suit was not yet ripe.
The court of appeals
disagreed, however, observing that the ripeness standard is relaxed in First
Amendment cases. 2 3 1 The court reasoned that the state law had a direct impact
on Richardson's First Amendment rights because the law caused Richardson to
revamp his approach to fundraising and the state's apparent intent to enforce the
law created a credible threat of enforcement. 232 The case was therefore ripe. 233
Without this lower ripeness standard, however, the ripeness of the case would
have been a much closer question.
A second useful case for consideration is the Third Circuit case of Peachlum
v. City of York. 234 In Peachlum, a resident of York brought a facial and asapplied challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting certain types of signs after the
city fined her for placing a freestanding, illuminated sign in her yard. 235 After
the city denied her request for a permit, Peachlum placed the sign in her yard
anyway, and the city fined her $539.236 She did not properly appeal the fine and
eventually sought relief from a federal district court, which held that the case
was not ripe because she had not exhausted her administrative remedies. 237 The
Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision regarding the ripeness of the
case, holding that the case was ripe and thus justiciable.
After noting the
lower ripeness standard for First Amendment cases,239 the Third Circuit noted
that Peachlum's First Amendment rights had already been allegedly infringed
upon, as she faced over $1,000 in fines and costs.
Additionally, the court
noted that the fee to appeal any decision by the zoning authority presented a
steep barrier to administrative finality.241 Although the Third Circuit may not
have had to rely on a lower ripeness standard in Peachlum to reach its decision,
its use of the lower standard resulted in a definitive finding of ripeness. 242
This long litany of almost identical quotations and examples of cases is not
designed to be tedious; rather, the list is intended to show the consensus that the

229. New Mexicansfor Bill Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1497.
230. Id. at 1497, 1498.
231. Id. at 1499.
232. See id. at 1500-01, 1503.
233. Id. at 1503.
234. 333 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2003).
235. Id. at 430-31.
236. Id. at 432.
237. Id. at 431, 433.
238. Id. at 433.
239. Id. at 434 (citing Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d
83, 90 (2d Cir. 2002)).
240. Id. at 437.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 438 ("It is also clear that Peachlum's claim should be deemed ripe based upon
the Abbott Laboratorieshardship test.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2013

31

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
442

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65: 411

federal circuit courts have reached on this issue. The circuits that have not
decided that the ripeness requirements are relaxed in First Amendment casesthe Fifth, Eighth, and Federal Circuits-also have not reached the opposite
conclusion. 24 That is, these courts have not explicitly held that the same
ripeness standard applies in First Amendment cases as in other cases.244 Rather,
they have simply applied the same ripeness test in First Amendment cases that
they apply in other cases.245 Although these decisions could plausibly be
interpreted as an implicit rejection of the position taken by the majority of
circuits, the lack of a discussion of that position suggests that these courts have
merely not addressed this question.
Notably, the Supreme Court has not taken up the question of which ripeness
standard applies in free speech cases. 246 While the Court has noted the
importance of answering questions raised in First Amendment challenges,247 the
Court has never stated that a lower ripeness bar exists for these claims. At the
same time, the Court has also never stated that such a lower bar does not exist. 24 8
Although some federal circuits have cited Supreme Court precedent to support
their claims that the ripeness bar is lower in First Amendment cases, that
precedent supports only the proposition that First Amendment rights are
important-not that their importance necessitates lowering the ripeness
requirement.249 Thus, the question involving the appropriate ripeness standard in

243. See, e.g., Miss. State Democratic Party v. Barbour, 529 F.3d 538, 547-48 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 301 (1998); Monk v. Huston, 340 F.3d 279, 282 (5th
Cir. 2003)) (examining whether the case presented a pure legal question and whether further factual
development was necessary to determine if the case was ripe); In re Workers' Comp. Refund, 46
F.3d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967))
(referring to the Abbott Laboratories test for ripeness without any qualification in a First
Amendment claim).
244. See, e.g., In re Workers' Comp. Refund, 46 F.3d at 821 (quoting Abbott Laboratories,

387 U.S. at 149) (referring to the Abbott Laboratoriestest for ripeness without any qualification in a
First Amendment claim).
245. See, e.g., id.; Barbour, 529 F.3d at 547-48 (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. at
301; Huston, 340 F.3d at 282) (examining whether the case presented a pure legal question and
whether further factual development was necessary to determine if the case was ripe).
246. Stein, supra note 95, at 54 (noting that the ripening process could be expedited by federal
courts if the "Supreme Court were to relax its ripeness rules expressly").
247. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247 n.6 (1974) ("Whichever way
we were to decide on the merits, it would be intolerable to leave unanswered, under these
circumstances, an important question of freedom of the press under the First Amendment. . .
(citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring))).
248. See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320-23 (1991) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979); O'Shea v. Littlejohn, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96
(1974); Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954);
Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)) (applying normal ripeness analysis
in holding that a challenge to an election law was not ripe for review).
249. See, e.g., Pearson v. Leavitt, 189 F. App'x 161, 163 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing the Forsyth
County v. NationalistMovement case to support the lower ripeness standard in First Amendment
cases despite Forsyth County only mentioning the importance of speech, not a lower ripeness
requirement (citing 505 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1992))).
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First Amendment claims remains without a direct answer from the Supreme
Court.
Despite the absence of Supreme Court precedent on point, scholars have
treated the general consensus among the circuit courts as the controlling rule.
Professor Fallon contrasts the standard for claims under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment with the standard for First Amendment claims, noting that
the ripeness bar is lower for free speech claims.250 Professor Lea Brilmayer also
notes the lower ripeness standard that courts use in First Amendment cases.251
Even Professors Charles Wright and Arthur Miller note in FederalPractice and
Procedurethat "[s]ince First Amendment claims were involved, [Babbitt] also
may reflect a tacit recognition that asserted injury to First Amendment rights
affects the ripeness balance in ways that other injuries may not."252 These
scholars have not, however, delved sufficiently into the reasoning behind this
lower standard for ripeness in First Amendment cases.
2.

The Rationalefor This Consensus

Simply knowing what courts have said about ripeness and that scholars
generally recognize a particular rule is not enough. The next question-one that
is more important-concerns the reason why courts have taken this position: the
answer that courts have consistently given is the importance of freedom of
speech.253
The most commonly invoked argument is that application of the normal
ripeness requirement would chill speech. For example, in New Mexicans for Bill
Richardson, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that "the chilling effect that potentially
unconstitutional burdens on free speech may occasion" provided a basis for the
lower standard in First Amendment cases.
The First Circuit also cited the
potential "chilling effect" as justification for this altered ripeness standard.255
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit noted this "chilling effect" when it joined the

250. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciabilityand Remedies-And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633, 641-42 (2006) (quoting Nichol, supra note

132, at 167) (noting the lower ripeness standard for First Amendment claims compared to claims
under the Takings Clause).
251. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or

Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297, 316 (1979) ("[An] example is the leniency of
the ripeness doctrine when easily chilled [F]irst [A]mendment rights are at stake."); see also Floren,
supra note 34, at 1115 ("First Amendment cases illustrate the different treatment of ripeness when
issues of constitutionality predominate.").
252. 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,supra note 12,

§ 3532.3,

at 514.

253. See, e.g., New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir.
1995) (quoting 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 12, § 3532.3, at 515).
254. Id.

255. Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) ("We have said that when
free speech is at issue, concerns over chilling effect call for a relaxation of ripeness requirements."
(citing El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 495-96 (1st Cir. 1992))).
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and the D.C. Circuit did as well.

257

Essentially, the "reasoning is that if an early challenge is not allowed, individuals
will forego their rights and the constitutionality of the law will never be
litigated. " If a person does forego the speech, that person will have suffered
an "irretrievable loss.",259 This lower ripeness standard is designed to prevent
such a loss and to "more jealously protect[]" free speech rights than other
rights. 260
These statements-many of which come from relatively recent cases-state
the rule as gospel, without offering any meaningful discussion of the original
nuances of the relaxed ripeness standard. In New Mexicans for Bill Richardson,

the case on which other circuits have relied heavily in adopting a lower ripeness
standard for First Amendment cases, 261 the Tenth Circuit cited ACORN v. City of
Tulsa.262 In that First Amendment case, the Tenth Circuit explicitly noted that it
saw "no prudential reason why the federal courts should not entertain this

256. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Chi. Area v. Kempiners, 700 F.2d 1115, 1122 (7th Cir.
1983) ("Requirements of ripeness are less strictly construed in the first amendment context due to
the chilling effect on protected expression which delay might produce."); see also, e.g., Pearson v.
Leavitt, 189 F. App'x 161, 163 (4th Cir. 2006) ("Ripeness requirements are relaxed in First
Amendment cases because of the potential chilling effect of unconstitutional restrictions on free
speech." (citing Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1992))).
257. Nat'l Student Ass'n, Inc. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("[lt appears
that suits alleging injury in the form of a chilling effect may be more readily justiciable than
comparable suits not so affected with a First Amendment interest.").
258. Brilmayer, supra note 251, at 316. See also Spartacus Youth League v. Bd. of Trs. of Ill.
Indus. Univ., 502 F. Supp. 789, 796-97 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("Injury to First Amendment rights may
result from the threat of enforcement itself, since it may chill the plaintiffs ardor and eliminate his
desire to engage in protected expression." (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965);
13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532, at 245 n.29
(1975))).
259. New Mexicans for Bill Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1500 (quoting 13B WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 12, § 3532.3, at 515); see also Nat'l Student Ass'n, Inc., 412 F.2d at 1111

("The peculiar feature of suits alleging a First Amendment chilling effect ... is that if the allegation
is correct, immediate and real injury is done to the plaintiffs interests if he does not speak or act as
he says he wants to."); cf Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984)
("Within the context of the First Amendment, the Court has enunciated other concerns that justify a
lessening of prudential limitations on standing. Even when a First Amendment challenge could be
brought by one actually engaged in protected activity, there is a possibility that, rather than risk
punishment for his conduct in challenging the statute, he will refrain from engaging further in the
protected activity. Society as a whole then would be the loser. Thus, when there is a danger of
chilling free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever possible may
be outweighed by society's interest in having the statute challenged.").
260. 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,supra note 12, § 3532.3, at 515.
261. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 90
(2d Cir. 2002) (relying on the relaxed standard as exemplified in New Mexicans for Bill
Richardson).

262. New Mexicans for Bill Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1499 (citing ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835
F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1987)).
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suit." 263 The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in ACORN was drawn by analogy to a
standing case.264 But when the Tenth Circuit explicitly held that ripeness should
be a less stringent test in the First Amendment context in New Mexicansfor Bill
Richardson, the court did not note that one of the cases on which it was primarily
relying focused only on prudential considerations. 265
Nevertheless, merely because recent cases do not delve into the original
reasoning behind the lower ripeness standard does not mean that those cases
cannot be logically sound. Ultimately, courts' adoption of the relaxed ripeness
standard rests on the exalted place that free speech holds in American
constitutional law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized a special
place for the First Amendment.266 The Court has stated that freedom of speech
"lies at the foundation of a free society," 267 and it has given plaintiffs greater
leeway in challenging restrictions on speech than in challenging other types of
laws.
This emphasis on speech is nothing new; in fact, it can be traced back to
the Founding Fathers, whose influence on constitutional law has only grown in
recent decades.269 Thomas Jefferson, for instance, wrote in 1787:
The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the
very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to
decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or

263. ACORN, 835 F.2d at 739 (emphasis added) (quoting Ass'n of Cmty. Org. for Reform
Now v. Municipality of Golden, 744 F.2d 739, 745 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984)).
264. See id (quoting Municipalityof Golden, 744 F.2d at 745 n.3).
265. See New Mexicans for Bill Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1499-1500 (quoting Martin Tractor
Co. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 627 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Nat'l Student Ass'n, Inc. v.
Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,supra note 12, §
3532.3, at 515) (citing Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th Cir. 1990)) (adopting a
lower ripeness standard without discussing the reasoning of ACORN).
266. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937), overruled on other grounds
by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) ("[F]reedom of thought, and speech ... is the
matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.").
267. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 486 (1960)). On the subject of core political speech receiving great protection, see
Citizens United v. Fed Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) ("[P]olitical speech must
prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.").
268. See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988) ("[I]n the
First Amendment context, [1]itigants ... are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own
rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the
statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." (quoting Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
947, 956-57 (1984))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-619 (2008) (citations
omitted) (employing originalism to interpret the Second Amendment). See generally Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989) (describing the benefits and
detriments of originalism as a theory of interpretation).
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newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to
prefer the latter.270
Justice Cardozo took a similar view of the freedom of speech, writing that
the "freedom [of thought and speech] . . . is the matrix, the indispensible

condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 2 7 1 The importance of
freedom of speech is reinforced by the fact that it was included in the First
Amendment.
And fears about chilling this important right provide a rationale
for applying a less stringent burden for ripeness in the First Amendment context.
Given the importance of speech in a democratic society, federal courts take
their duty to protect that right seriously.273 Indeed, the duty to protect citizens
from overreaching by the other branches of government undergirds the rationale
for the lower ripeness standard. For instance, the Third Circuit relied on this
justification, observing that "[a]t least in the First Amendment context, it has
been held that if the power to threaten to act in a given way influences the
exercise of constitutional rights, then the existence of that power can be
judicially reviewed as soon as the power is created." 274 Essentially, this is a
separation of powers rationale: federal courts have the duty to protect
constitutional rights, and when another branch threatens one of these rights, the
courts should step in and protect the right that is threatened.
IV. TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF RIPENESS AND FIRST AMENDMENT
CLAIMS

Part III described the consensus that federal circuit courts have reached
regarding ripeness in the First Amendment context, and it offered a justification
for that consensus. This Part now turns to the shortcomings of the consensus and

270. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), in JOHN
BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 357 (Justin Kaplan ed., 17th ed. 2002).

271. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326-27, overruledon other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 794 (1969).
272. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, "The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm the Reader
Became the Book, " 57 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2019 (2004) (footnote omitted) ("The First
Amendment is first, not because of random placement, but because the Founders viewed it as the
substantive centerpiece of their efforts, a description of the ideal democratic commonwealth they
hoped to found."). Of course, as originally proposed in the First Congress, the First Amendment
was actually the third proposed amendment. What is now the First Amendment is first only because
the states never ratified the first two proposed amendments when the other ten Amendments were
ratified in the 1790s. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 257 (1998) (discussing how the

First Amendment was not the first proposed amendment but has come to be regarded now as the
first one).
273. From the earliest days of the United States, federal courts have taken their obligation to
declare the law and protect rights seriously. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule.").
274. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979, 987 (3d Cir. 1986).
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its rationale. First, Part IV.A challenges the accepted assumption that First
Amendment rights deserve or need the relaxed ripeness standard they have been
afforded. Second, assuming that a relaxed ripeness standard is proper, Part IV.B
demonstrates how the current consensus fails to describe with precision exactly
what that lower standard entails.
A.

Why First Amendment Rights May Not Deserve or Need a Special
Ripeness Standard

Fundamentally, the justification for the relaxed ripeness standard is the
preeminence of free speech rights in American constitutional law.275 Under this
lower standard, any chilling effect that a law might have on speech is
"unacceptable" because speech is so important. 276 Yet despite the importance of
free speech rights, this justification may not prove to be as conclusive as courts
have assumed. This Part explores how placing First Amendment rights on such
a high pedestal devalues other important rights that are just as critical to
American society and how the standard ripeness analysis can adequately protect
First Amendment rights, even if those rights deserve preeminence in American
constitutional law.
1.

Recognizing the Equal Value of Other ConstitutionalRights

The Constitution protects many rights: some are the subject of great
scholarly debate and others receive virtually no attention.277 Among the rights
that receive much attention are First Amendment rights. 278 Freedom of speech
is, undoubtedly, critical to a democratic society such as the United States. 9In
addition to being critical to a democratic society, protecting people's right to free
speech is also justified on the grounds that free speech ensures a marketplace of

275. See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1126 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting "that
overly broad statutes can have an unacceptable chilling effect on freedom of speech").
277. Compare, for example, the vast quantity of ink spilt over the First Amendment, Fourth
Amendment, Eighth Amendment, or Fourteenth Amendment with the relative dearth of scholarly
writing on the Third Amendment. A search on Westlaw's database of federal court cases for "First
Amendment," "Fourth Amendment," "Eighth Amendment," and "Fourteenth Amendment" all
return the maximum possible number of results (10,000 cases and 10,000 secondary sources), while
a search for "Third Amendment" yields only 1,047 cases and 2,360 secondary sources (searches
conducted on Oct. 14, 2013).
278. See supra note 277 (noting that a search on Westlaw's database of federal court cases for
"First Amendment" returns the maximum possible number of results).
279. See Keith Werhan, The ClassicalAthenian Ancestry of American Freedom of Speech,

2008 SUP. CT. REv. 293, 296 (2008) ("Classical Athenians and contemporary Americans have
regarded freedom of speech as indispensable to their democracies.").
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ideas and promotes a search for truth.280 On these bases, courts reason that free
281
speech rights deserve a lower ripeness standard.
Treating First Amendment rights as the most critical rights-in the words of
Justice Cardozo, as "the matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom" 282-deemphasizes other constitutional rights that are just
as critical to American society. Consider three examples of other rights
protected by the Constitution that are ust as important to maintaining a
democratic society as freedom of speech. 2 8
First, the Fourth Amendment protects people from "unreasonable searches
and seizures." 284
Although the Court's modem Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence may no longer be tethered to the original meaning of the text,285
the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is still to protect people from
government intrusion into "their persons, houses, papers, and effects" in an
inappropriate manner. 286 The Court has recognized this purpose, holding that
"[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of
this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." 287 Recognizing the critical nature
of this right, Justice Frankfurter called it "basic to [our] free society." 2 88

280. See generally Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Searchfor Truth
as a Theory ofFree Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595 (2011) (discussing various justifications

for the protection of the freedom of speech).
281. See cases cited supra notes 216-225.
282. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruledon othergrounds by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
283. Of course, a democracy and a republic are not the same, and the Constitution creates a
republic, not a democracy. Here, I use democracy loosely, in the way that is often used in common
vernacular to describe the United States, despite the imprecision of that term.
284. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

285. See AMAR, supra note 272, at 64-77 (citations omitted) (discussing the Fourth
Amendment's text and the current framework for Fourth Amendment cases); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994) (arguing that the

Fourth Amendment's "text, history, and plain old common sense" do not support the current
framework of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). Naturally, not all scholars agree with Professor
Amar's proposal for changing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See generally David Sklansky,
The FourthAmendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000) (rejecting the trend of

basing decisions about the Fourth Amendment on history).
286. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

287. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
288. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (emphasis added), overruledon other grounds
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), quoted in Camara,387 U.S. at 528.
Other rights in criminal procedure-such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, the Sixth Amendment rights for criminal defendants, and the Seventh Amendment
right to a trial by jury-offer similar protections against government overreach; thus, they are also
important rights that ensure the government does not become too powerful. This Article only
discusses the Fourth Amendment because of considerations of space and because the Fourth
Amendment is widely recognized in American society.
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Second, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause also provides a fundamental
protection from overreaching by government.289 The Takings Clause declares
that the government "shall [not take] private property ... for public use, without
just compensation." 29 0 Much like the Fourth Amendment, the Takings Clause
implicitly recognizes a government power 291-in the case of the Fifth
Amendment, the power of eminent domain 292-but imposes a restriction on how
that power can be exercised by requiring the government to take prope
only
for a public purpose and only by paying fair value for the property.
The
imposition of this restriction reflected the Framers' belief in protecting private
property294-an unsurprising goal for the Framers, particularly given the
emphasis that influential political philosophers had placed on property rights
since long before the creation of the United States.
Although the Supreme
Court mam long ago have abandoned Lochner v. New York 96 and similar
holdings, the essentiality of property rights to a free market system has not
dwindled.298 Thus, just like the right to be free from government intrusion by

289. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

290. Id.
291. See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946) ("[The Fifth Amendment] is
a tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private property for public use, rather than a grant
of new power.").
292. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The power of eminent domain, far older than the federal
government, may be traced back to England and ancient Rome. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES

E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1102 (4th ed. 1998) (tracing the history of the eminent domain power).
293. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

294. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 601 ("The framers obviously were concerned about
protecting economic rights and thus included in the Constitution provisions such as the Contracts
Clause and the Takings Clause.").
295. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 270 (Peter Laslett ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (identifying "Possessions," along with "Life, Health, [and]
Liberty" as the preeminent rights of individuals).
296. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729, 730 (1963) (citing Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905)) (noting that the Lochner doctrine "has long since been discarded").
297. See id. at 730 (listing "Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases" as similar holdings that
have been abandoned). For a good discussion and an alternative theory of this move away from
Lochner to embrace President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal agenda, see generally BARRY
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION (1998).
298. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, Two LUCKY PEOPLE: MEMOIRS 605

(1998) (calling property rights "the most basic of human rights and an essential foundation for other
human rights"); see also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property
Rights: Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J. L. & TECH. 35, 41 (2011) ("The existence and

recognition of property is a fundamental aspect of a free market economy."). The Supreme Court's
minimal protection for economic rights in recent decades has drawn scathing criticism from Judge
Janice Rogers Brown of the D.C. Circuit, who argued, "This standard [for protecting economic
rights] is particularly troubling in light of the pessimistic view of human nature that animated the
Framing of the Constitution-a worldview that the American polity and its political handmaidens
have, unfortunately, shown to be largely justified." Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 481
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., concurring).
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unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to be secure in one's property is a
right that is fundamental to American society.
Third, the right to vote is essential to a free society.
Suffrage protections
are scattered throughout the Constitution: they are present in Article I, Section
4;300 the Fifteenth Amendment;301 the Nineteenth Amendment;302 the TwentyFourth Amendment;303 and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.304 All of these
constitutional provisions protect the right to vote, whether by prohibiting a state
from denying a citizen the right to vote based on race, gender, or age or through
laws that make voting more difficult for some people by requiring a poll tax.
These protections make perfect sense; after all, if a republican form of
government is based on allowing people to choose their representatives,
protecting the right to choose those representatives is essential for the
government to exist and function.306 The Supreme Court has called voting "a
fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights." 3 07 The
right to vote is so important that the Supreme Court has said that "o]ther rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." 0

299. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIX, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
In some ways, the right to vote may trump the right to free speech See, e.g., Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1976) (per curiam)) (recognizing that the government can compel certain
election-related disclosures); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a state law
prohibiting political speech within one hundred feet of the entrance to a polling place was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest). The lower ripeness standard for free speech
cases, however, indicates a preference for hearing those claims at an earlier stage than voting rights
cases, despite the critical nature of voting rights in a democratic society.
300. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. Although this section does not explicitly guarantee the right to
vote, it implicitly assumes that people have that right. Otherwise, the Constitution would not need
to include rules for the time, place, and manner in which elections for members of Congress and the
Senate would be held.
301. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude[.]").
302. U.S. CONST. amend. X[X, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
303. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any
primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.").
304. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of age.").
305. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
306. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
307. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
308. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17.
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These three examples-protection from unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Takings Clause, and the right to vote-are just a few of the many examples
of critical rights besides the right to free speech protected under the Constitution.
Although free speech rights are undeniably important to a free and democratic
society, claiming that they are more important than these other rights is, at best, a
tenuous proposition. After all, the right to vote is the basis of a democracy. 309
Speech may allow citizens to discuss for whom they should vote, but voting
itself is what keeps government functioning. Similarly, although protecting
private property may not be as fundamental to preserving a republican form of
government, it is fundamental to protecting the free market economy the United
States has enjoyed for centuries, and it is as central to America's identity as its
form of government.310 Likewise, protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures-as well as other protections in criminal procedure-guard against the
government becoming too powerful and capable of imprisoning citizens without
proof of their guilt.31 Thus, all three of these rights are, like those included in
the First Amendment, important to preserving American society. Free speech
may very well "lie[] at the foundation of a free society," 3 12 but it does not lie
there alone-in other words, it is not a cornerstone on which all of American
government and society can rest.313 Other rights, equally as important, play just
as critical a role in ensuring the vitality of a free society.
This argument is admittedly premised on the idea that a right is only
valuable if a remedy exists to vindicate it, and in the United States, rights are
vindicated through the judicial system. 314 The idea that every right must have a
remedy has long been part of American law, going at least as far back as Chief
Justice Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison31 in 1803;31 this premise
should not be especially controversial. In the context of a lower ripeness
standard for free speech claims devaluing other rights, the idea that every right

309. See supra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
310. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 298, at 41 ("The existence and recognition of property
is a fundamental aspect of a free market economy."); Daniel Larson, Yesterday's Technology,
Tomorrow: How the Government's Treatment of Intellectual Property Prevents Soldiers from
Receiving the Best Tools to Complete Their Mission, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 171,

185 (2007) ("Many commentators have characterized the United States as a free-market economy.")
(citations omitted).
311. See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil
Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1223, 1237 (2004) ("The Framers

adopted the Fourth Amendment to limit the government's search power, including its power to
conduct suspicionless searches.").
312. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 486 (1960)).
313. Cf Ephesians 2:20 (describing Jesus Christ as "the cornerstone" of the church).
314. Cf Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 274-78 (1997) (citations
omitted) (discussing, in the context of federal versus state courts, how courts vindicate rights).
315. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
316. See id. at 163 ("The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.").
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needs a remedy is particularly apt. Although someone with a Fourth
Amendment claim, Takings Clause claim, or voting rights claim could
eventually have a ripe case heard in federal court, they would not get a remedy
as soon as a person with a First Amendment claim. This difference in timing
reflects a difference in perception of the respective rights' importance. A right
that courts view as important is more likely to be remedied quickly than a right
that is not viewed as important. This difference in timing shows how the lower
ripeness standard for free speech claims places this right above others.
In treating free speech rights differently than other important rights, courts
do a disservice to these other rights. The difference in treatment effectively
announces that those rights are not worthy of such great protection. Why free
speech rights have received this extra protection is unclear: perhaps it is because
freedom of speech is more accessible to ordinary citizens, or because lawyers
and judges depend on the freedom of speech for their professional livelihoods, 318
or because judges genuinely believe First Amendment rights are more important
than other rights. None of these explanations, however, justifies the relaxed
ripeness standard for free speech claims. First, the fact that the First Amendment
is more accessible to ordinary citizens is no reason for shaping justiciability
doctrines in a particular way: justiciability itself is far more complicated and
nuanced than ordinary citizens would even want to understand, and it is a subject
that should maintain internal and external coherency. 319 Second, if courts lower
ripeness in the First Amendment context to protect lawyers, such a selfinterested justification should be rejected unhesitatingly as unprincipled and
lacking coherence to the larger ripeness doctrine. Finally, even if judges do
believe that the First Amendment is different, this Article has shown how other
rights are equally as important to protecting America's democratic society.
Thus, because the rights protected by the First Amendment are no more
important to a democratic society than many other constitutional rights-and
because all of these important constitutional rights deserve similar protectionFirst Amendment rights do not deserve a ripeness standard that is more relaxed
than the standard for other constitutional rights. 320

317. See supra note 1.

318. This explanation is admittedly cynical, and I do not endorse it. Rather, I included it for
the sake of providing a more comprehensive list of potential explanations.
319. In fact, to the extent that this argument has any force, it actually counsels for using the
same ripeness standard because one standard is likely more easily understood by the public.
320. Using the same ripeness test for all constitutional rights is a better option than using the
relaxed test for other important constitutional rights. See 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,supra

note 12, § 3532.3, at 530 ("First Amendment rights need not be the only rights accorded special
ripeness treatment. Interests in privacy or confidentiality might come to qualify, on the theory that
effective remedies are difficult after an invasion has occurred." (footnotes omitted)). The standard
ripeness test is sufficient both to protect constitutional rights and to ensure federal courts do not
decide disputes that are not cases or controversies under Article III.
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How the Standard Ripeness Test Adequately Protects First
Amendment Rights

In addition to the concern that the elevation of free speech rights devalues
other rights, First Amendment rights perhaps should be subject to the standard
ripeness test for an additional reason: these rights do not need a lower ripeness
standard to be protected sufficiently.
The relaxed ripeness standard is typically justified on the basis that if the
ripeness standard is not lowered, then speech will be chilled because people will
be forced to choose between potential prosecution and foregoing speech.321
Under this reasoning, other rights impose no such difficult choice before any law
that may infringe on those rights is enforced. For example, in comparing the
Takings Clause with the Free Speech Clause, the Tenth Circuit wrote:
[T]o decide if a taking has occurred within the meaning of the [F]ifth
[A]mendment, a court must consider "the economic impact of the
challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations. Those factors simply cannot be
evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final,
definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to
the particular land in question." By contrast, a [F]irst [A]mendment
challenge to the facial validity of a statute is a strictly legal question; it
does not involve the application of the statute in a specific factual
setting. Further, unlike an alleged unconstitutional taking, an ordinance
that proscribes [F]irst [A]mendment activity inhibits those who would
speak but for the threat of criminal sanctions. ACORN, therefore, has
already suffered a threatened injury, and its constitutional claims are
ripe for decision.322
Such is the typical argument as to why First Amendment rights need a lower
ripeness standard.
But a careful consideration of the standard ripeness test reveals that the test
is perfectly capable of protecting First Amendment rights and preventing any
chilling effect. The normal ripeness test requires that the issues be fit for judicial
review and that a court evaluate the hardship to the parties of withholding
review.323 A plaintiff bringing a First Amendment claim-especially a facial
challenge-can generally satisfy the first part of this test because the claim is
almost always a legal question focusing on the constitutionality of a law. 32 4

321. See supra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
322. ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 739-40 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Williamson
Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985)).
323. See supra Part II.A.
324. See, e.g., Fla. Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar, 273 F.3d 1318, 1321, 1323-25 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); Digital Props., Inc. v. City of
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Because a pure question of law is typically fit for judicial review,325 this prong of
the ripeness test is not difficult for a plaintiff with a First Amendment claim to
overcome.
Thus, the more important question for determining if the standard ripeness
test adequately protects First Amendment rights is whether plaintiffs in these
cases can show that hardship exists. The development of the ripeness test has
shown that in the context of a preenforcement challenge-a category
encompassing many First Amendment claims-a plaintiff can demonstrate
hardship by showing a credible threat of enforcement. 6
Showing a credible threat is not a particularly high hurdle to overcome. In
some cases, the threat of enforcement is clear, such as in Steffel v. Thompson.327
In that case, Steffel was told, on threat of arrest, to stop handing out leaflets
Thus, he faced a credible threat of
protesting the Vietnam War.328
enforcement. 3 29 But even in cases in which the threat was not quite so clear from
the actions of a government official, courts are likely to infer a credible threat of
prosecution.

For instance, in New Hampshire Right to Life Political Action

Committee v. Gardner,330 the First Circuit wrote that "when dealing with preenforcement challenges to recently enacted ... statutes that facially restrict
expressive activity by the class to which the plaintiff belongs, courts will assume
a credible threat of prosecution in the absence of compelling contrary
evidence."33 1
Of course, because a real threat must exist for a plaintiff to face hardship, 332
distinguishin "between fears that are chimerical and those that are realistic" can
be difficult.
Despite this difficulty, the burden of showing a credible threat
only requires the plaintiff to show that the fear of enforcement is "objectively
reasonable." 334 This standard compels a plaintiff to produce a "factual record of
an actual or threatened application" of the allegedly unconstitutional law.335

Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1997)) (discussing the ripeness of a facial challenge to parts
of Florida's campaign finance provisions); New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d
1495, 1499-1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (discussing the ripeness standard and
explaining how the state statute created a legal dilemma for Bill Richardson).
325. See supra Part ll.A.1.
326. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
327. 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974).
328. See id. at 455.
329. Id. at 475.
330. 99 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1996).
331. Id. at 15. Note that although this case focused on standing, rather than on ripeness, the
fundamental analysis-whether a credible threat of enforcement exists-applies in both contexts.
See id. at 10.
332. See Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Although the ripeness
requirement is somewhat relaxed in the First Amendment context, there nonetheless must be a
credible fear of enforcement." (citing Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d 469, 479 (2d
Cir. 1999))).
333. R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1999).
334. Id. (quoting N.H. Right to Life PoliticalAction Comm., 99 F.3d at 14).
335. Woodall v. Reno, 47 F.3d 656, 658 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Factors to consider in determining whether such a record has been produced
include whether the plaintiff has a "concrete plan to violate the law in question"
and whether authorities have issued a "specific warning or threat" to the plaintiff,
as well as the history of past prosecution. 336
This standard of requiring an objectively reasonable threat is essential for
ensuring that the bar is not lowered too far-in a manner that would allow
adjudication of cases that are not factually developed or cases based on a
speculative fear.337 As for ensuring that a case is factually developed, lowering
the bar too far runs the risk of allowing federal courts to decide a case when no
concrete controversy exists.338 Given that showing a credible threat is already a
relatively low bar, pushing the bar any lower risks allowing courts to hear cases
without parties that would face a truly meaningful hardship if review is withheld,
as no "live controversy" exists between the plaintiff and defendant.339
As for ensuring that an unreasonable fear is not the basis of a case, the
objectively reasonable basis for showing a credible threat of enforcement
protects courts from hearing cases only because a particular plaintiff is unusually
sensitive to a perceived threat.340 The law often rejects such hypersensitivity as a
basis for a claim. In tort law, for instance, a battery claim requires that a
touching be offensive based on a standard of objective reasonableness, not based
on a plaintiff s individual sensitivities. 341 Similarly, in the context of ripeness, a
plaintiff should not be deemed to face a hardship sufficient to meet the ripeness
standard merely because that person perceives a threat of chilled speech.
Adopting such a subjective test would so relax the requirements for filing a
justiciable claim that eager litigants could get their cases into federal court with
relatively little effort, simply alleging a fear of not being able to speak without
showing any concrete desire to actually engage in that speech.
Examining a few First Amendment ripeness cases demonstrates how the
standard ripeness test can sufficiently protect First Amendment rights. In some
cases, such as Peachlum, the case is clearly ripe under the standard test.3 42 In
that case, the plaintiff had actually exercised her right to speak and had been

336. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing San Diego Cnty. Gun
Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126-29 (9th Cir. 1996)).
337. See N.H. Right to Life PoliticalAction Comm., 99 F.3d at 14.

338. Federal courts, of course, cannot issue advisory opinions. See supra note 68.
339. See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991) (requiring a live controversy or
dispute involving the challenged statute).
340. See, e.g., N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm., 99 F.3d at 14 (noting that "[a]

party's subjective fear that she may be prosecuted" does not meet the objectively reasonable test).
341. See, e.g., Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1361 (Del. 1995) ("Although a battery may
consist of any unauthorized touching of the person which causes offense or alarm, the test for
whether a contact is "offensive" is not wholly subjective. The law does not permit recovery for the
extremely sensitive who become offended at the slightest contact. Rather, for a bodily contact to be
offensive, it must offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 19 (1965))).

342. See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text.
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fined.
It is difficult to imagine any federal court not finding that case ripe.
Thus, for cases like Peachlum, the standard ripeness test sufficiently protects
First Amendment rights.
Other cases present closer questions. For example, in Wolfson v.
Brammer,3 4 5 an Arizona lawyer challenged provisions of the Arizona Code of
Judicial Conduct.346 Although the lawyer had already lost an election and did
not intend to run in a future election, he "alleged that he wanted to engage in
certain campaign-related activities and political speech but refrained from doing
so, believing that the activities [were] prohibited by ... the Code." 347 Noting the
relaxed ripeness standard for First Amendment cases, the Ninth Circuit held that
Wolfson's challenges to all provisions but one were ripe because Wolfson had
sufficiently alleged a specific plan to engage in the proscribed conduct and had
censored himself to avoid prosecution, thereby suffering a hardship that merited
immediate judicial decision on his claims.348
Whether the Wolfson case would have been ripe under the standard ripeness
test is a far closer question than whether the claims in Peachlum would have
been ripe. Despite being a closer question, Wolfson still likely would have been
ripe under the standard test. The plaintiff had been clear in his intention to
engage in conduct involving a constitutional interest that would violate the law at
issue. 49 This factor carries great weight in determining whether a party faces a

343. Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 432 (3d Cir. 2003).
344. This case involved some issues of administrative finality and exhaustion of
administrative remedies, but the court held that those were of no concern because of the judgments
already entered against Peachlum and the clearly adversarial positions of the parties. See Peachlum,
333 F.3d at 437. The court also stated that a facial First Amendment challenge could be ripe "even
during the pendency of an administrative proceeding." Id at 438. The concerns about
administrative finality could be a reason for finding that this case was not ripe; however, if the final
administrative formalities had been completed, and if the parties otherwise had been in the exact
same position, the case would unquestionably be ripe.
345. 616 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010).
346. Id. at 1051.
347. Id. at 1052.
348. Id. at 1059-62 (citations omitted).
349. See id. at 1059 (citing Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139
(9th Cir. 2000)). Note that some courts do not require a plaintiff to allege an intent to engage in the
conduct, but merely a credible threat of enforcement if the plaintiff were to engage in the proscribed
conduct. See, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Box, 470 F. Supp. 2d 855, 836, 864 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (quoting
and citing Babbitt v. United Farm Works Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 293, 298-301 (1979))
(explaining that Babbittstands for the proposition that a case may be ripe "even in the absence of an
allegation that the plaintiffs intended to engage in any conduct prohibited by" the challenged
statute). The Box court's reading of Babbitt, however, is misguided. In Babbitt, the Court noted
that further factual development showing that the plaintiffs actually participated in an election was
unnecessary to decide the case. See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 300-01. The Court did not say that the
plaintiffs had no intention not to engage in the conduct regulated by the law at issue; rather, the
Court simply said that further factual development was not necessary to bring the issues into clearer
focus for the case to be decided. See id. A better view is expressed in Norton v. Ashcroft, in which
the court said, "In a First Amendment pre-enforcement challenge, the inquiry usually focuses on
how imminent the threat of prosecution is and whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an
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credible threat-and thus a significant hardship-not only in First Amendment
cases, but also in other types of cases. 350 The intent to engage in the conduct
prohibited by the Code of Judicial Conduct, along with the neatly framed legal
question of the code's constitutionality, suggests that this case would have been
ripe even without the relaxed ripeness standard.351
The fact that some cases may not be ripe under the standard ripeness test,
even though such cases would have been ripe under the relaxed test, is of no
great concern. Any case that could be ripe only under the lower standard is of
questionable ripeness already. If the speech is truly important, someone will
almost certainly allege an intent to engage in that speech so that the person will
be able to present a ripe case under the standard ripeness test.352 After all, the
bar for showing a hardship is not that high under the standard test.353 Not
requiring a plaintiff to show even that level of hardship leaves too great a
possibility of hearing cases involving abstract legal questions without a concrete
underlying factual dispute.354
First Amendment claims, therefore, do not need the relaxed ripeness
standard. The normal ripeness standard provides all of the protection that First
Amendment rights need to ensure that claims can be heard by federal courts
when those rights are allegedly violated. Lowering the ripeness bar is not
necessary to protect the freedom of speech; rather, lowering the bar only risks
having federal courts decide cases based on merely abstract legal questions
without a real, concrete dispute. Such abstract questions would be more fit for a
law review article than a federal court.

intention to refuse to comply with the statute." 298 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Nat'l Rifle
Ass'n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 285 (6th Cir. 1997)).
350. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Nicholas, 353 F. Supp. 2d 231, 246 (D.R.I.
2005) (noting that the plaintiff had not alleged an intention to engage in conduct affected with a
constitutional interest to have a ripe case in the context of the Commerce Clause and federal
preemption).
351. Earlier, this Article suggested that New Mexicans for Bill Richardson would be a closer
question under the standard ripeness test. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text. That
case would most likely have been ripe under the standard test for the same reasons that Wolfson
would likely have been ripe under this standard.
352. See, e.g., Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1051, 1059 (citing Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000)) (determining that Wolfson established the requisite
intent to engage in the barred political speech).
353. See supra Part II.A.2.
354. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) ("[T]he federal courts established
pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions. For adjudication of
constitutional issues 'concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions' are
requisite." (quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947))).
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B. How the Current Consensus Fails to Describe with Precision What the
Relaxed StandardEntails-andthe Dangers of This Lack ofPrecision

As demonstrated above, because other constitutional rights are equally
important and the standard ripeness test adequately protects free speech rights,
free speech claims do not deserve a relaxed ripeness standard. Part IV.B
demonstrates how, even accepting the propriety of a relaxed ripeness standard
for First Amendment cases, the current consensus among the federal courts of
appeals lacks the necessary precision to protect the constitutional foundations of
ripeness.
The most glaring problem with the relaxed ripeness standard is that this
relaxed standard-as courts currently articulate it-lacks any definition for what
relaxed means. Looking back to the quotations from circuit court cases stating
this relaxed standard for First Amendment claims, it is notable that all of these
decisions made a simple, one-sentence statement about the test.35
As an
example, the following is the Seventh Circuit's entire statement of the rule:
"Requirements of ripeness are less strictly construed in the [F]irst [A]mendment
context due to the chilling effect on protected expression which delay might
produce."356 The court offered no further explanation.357 Even the Tenth Circuit
in New Mexicans for Bill Richardson-arguablythe case that discusses the

relaxed ripeness standard in the greatest depth-offered only a discussion of why
First Amendment claims should have a relaxed standard, without discussing
what that relaxed standard means in practice. 358
With virtually no guidance from the federal courts of appeals regarding how
the relaxed ripeness standard functions, one is left to theorize and draw
conclusions from the case law. The relaxed ripeness test could affect, at least
potentially, either the constitutional or prudential basis of the doctrine. Of the
greatest concern is that this lower standard affects the constitutional basis of
ripeness. Because Article III limits federal courts to deciding only cases or
controversies-thereby prohibiting advisory opinions 359-all cases must meet a
certain threshold before a court can hear them.360 Thus, the relaxed ripeness
standard cannot permit a finding of ripeness if the case does not meet this

355. See cases cited supra notes 216-25 and accompanying text.
356. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Chi. Area v. Kempiners, 700 F.2d 1115, 1122 (7th Cir.
1983).
357. See id.

358. See New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499-1500 (10th Cir.
1995) (offering no indication of how the relaxed ripeness standard functions differently than the
traditional test).
359. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) ("As is well known,
the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory
opinions."); see generally Pushaw, supra note 67 (providing historical background on the
development of this rule).
360. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 90 (noting the separation of powers concerns that arise by
allowing federal courts to consider cases not "capable of effective determination").
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threshold. Yet most courts rarely are sufficiently clear about what part of the
ripeness test is the constitutional core of the doctrine.361 Some courts have tried
to delineate these differences more clearly. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has
stated that the constitutional inquiry focuses on "whether the facts alleged, under
all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between the
parties having adverse legal interests;" 362 the prudential inquiry focuses on the
two factors from the Abbott Laboratoriestest. 3 But this articulation has never
taken hold among a majority of courts, and the Supreme Court has never
embraced it. 36 4 Hence, a lack of guidance about the constitutional core of
ripeness remains, and allowing the relaxed ripeness standard to apply to free
speech claims risks cutting into this core. If these concerns prove to be valid,
and the lower ripeness standard does affect the constitutional basis for the
doctrine, then lowering the standard may very well be unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, putting aside these legitimate concerns about infringing on the
constitutional requirements of ripeness, the relaxed ripeness standard is more
likely to affect the prudential basis of ripeness. From one of the Court's earliest
discussions of ripeness in Mitchell65 to more recent discussions in the past few
Terms,366 the Court has been steadfast in its view that a plaintiff must meet the
threshold requirement of constitutional ripeness. 367 Although constitutional
368
provisions are not always absolute, the Court has never suggested that the
constitutional requirements for ripeness can vary depending on the basis of the
*369
claim.

361. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010)
(quoting Nat'1 Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003); Reno v.
Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)) (citing Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537
U.S. 51, 56 n.4 (2002)) (noting that ripeness contains both constitutional and prudential
considerations and holding that the case was ripe without explaining which aspects were
constitutional and which aspects were prudential).
362. See In re Coleman, 560 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Braren,
338 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2003)).
363. Id. at 1006.
364. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 670 n.2 (declining to express a view regarding
whether "a federal court may consider a question of prudential ripeness on its own motion").
365. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 90 ("Unless these courts respect the limits of [Article III], they
intrude upon powers vested in the legislative or executive branches.").
The focus on the constitutional nature of the Court's decision in Mitchell has prompted one
scholar to call the decision "the high-water mark of a stringent ripeness doctrine." Adler, supra
note 25, at 169.
366. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 670 n.2 ("Ripeness reflects constitutional
considerations that implicate 'Article III limitations on judicial power,' as well as 'prudential
reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction."' (quoting Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18)).
367. Babbitt v. United Farm Works Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979).
368. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 749 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Of course, the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute, as Justice Holmes so
long ago pointed out in his aphorism concerning the right to shout 'fire' in a crowded theater if there
was no fire.").
369. Stein, supra note 95, at 54 (noting that the ripening process could be expedited by federal
courts if the "Supreme Court were to relax its ripeness rules expressly").
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With no apparent room for lowering the constitutional requirement of
ripeness, the relaxed ripeness standard must therefore affect the doctrine's
Of course, such nonconstitutional prudential
prudential considerations.
considerations are in a court's discretion, meaning that a court "is always free to
modify [them]." 3 70 The Supreme Court has embraced, at least in the closely
related context of standing, "a lessening of prudential limitations" in First
Amendment cases. 371 Given the close connection between standing and
ripeness, lowering the prudential considerations in the ripeness doctrine-rather
than the constitutional ones-seems logical.372
Additionally, earlier precedents support viewing the relaxed ripeness
standard as affecting the prudential considerations of the doctrine. In ACORN v.
City of Tulsa, the case that was so influential to the court's decision in New
Mexicansfor Bill Richardson,373 the Tenth Circuit emphasized that no prudential
considerations kept the court from deciding the case.
The court cited ACORN
v. Golden,375 a standing case in which the Tenth Circuit noted the fact that no
prudential considerations suggested the court "should not entertain th[e] suit"
involving a facial challenge to a particular law.376 This conclusion is further
supported by the Third Circuit's decision in Felmeister v. Office of Attorney

Ethics,377 in which the court wrote: "The ripeness doctrine, like other
justiciability doctrines, derives ultimately from the requirement in Article III of
the United States Constitution that federal courts are empowered to decide cases
and controversies. Even when the constitutional minimum has been met,
however, prudential considerations may still counsel judicial restraint." 378 Given
these judicial decisions and the ability of courts to tweak judicially imposed
prudential requirements, the relaxed ripeness standard must affect the prudential
prong of ripeness.
Having resolved the issue of what part of the ripeness test the lower standard
affects, this Part now moves to another question: To what extent is the standard
test relaxed? Is it relaxed to the point of being essentially nonexistent? Is it

370. Id. at 54 ("[T]o the extent that the ripeness test is prudentially based, the Court is always
free to modify it.").
371. Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984) (emphasis
added).
372. See Floren,supra note 34, at 1115-16 (quoting Joseph H.Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 956;
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486, 487 (1965)) (citing Nichol, supra note 132, at 155-56))
(making this exact assumption by applying the reasoning from Joseph H.Munson Co. to ripeness).
373. See New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1498-1500, 1504
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 1987)).
374. See ACORN, 835 F.2d at 739 (quoting and citing Ass'n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now v.
Municipality of Golden, 744 F.2d 739, 745 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984)).
375. See id. (quoting Municipalityof Golden, 744 F.2d at 745 n.3).
376. Id.
377. 856 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1988).
378. Id. at 535 (quoting Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Phila. v. Heckler, 789
F.2d 931, 940 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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relaxed to some extent, but not so much as to all but eliminate it? Is the extent of
the relaxation dependent on the facts of each case? 379
The case law provides no meaningful guidance on this question because,
unfortunately, most decisions do not actually note how the lowered standard is
affecting the analysis. For instance, in Sullivan v. City of Augusta,38 the First
Circuit simply noted that Sullivan believed he would be denied a permit for a
parade because the time frame for applying for a permit based on the date on
which the parade was scheduled had passed; accordingly, he did not apply for
the permit and did not hold the parade.381 Without mentioning any prudential
considerations, the court simply stated that these facts made the case ripe. 38 2 On
the other hand, in Norton v. Ashcroft,383 the Sixth Circuit held that-even under
the relaxed ripeness standard-the case was not ripe because, despite ambiguity
in the challenged law, the plaintiff had not changed his conduct and could not
show a credible threat of enforcement. 384 In fact, it is hard to find a First
Amendment case in which a court explicitly mentioned prudential considerations
and decided that the case was not ripe. One of the few cases in this category is
Alaska Right to Life PoliticalAction Committee v. Feldman, a Ninth Circuit case

in which the court held that the plaintiff s claim was unripe because the plaintiff
had not shown that hardship would result if the case was not decided at that
time.385
The problem with these and other similar cases from the federal circuit
courts is that they never explain how the lower ripeness standard affects the
analysis. They do not note, for example, whether the case would have turned out
differently had the court applied the standard ripeness test-rather than the
special First Amendment test. 86 Instead of offering such helpful analysis, these
cases simply undertake what appears to be a normal ripeness analysis, 38 7
effectively leaving scholars and lawyers guessing as to how low the bar actually
goes in First Amendment cases and what prudential considerations, if any, would
keep a court from holding that a free speech claim is not ripe.

379. This last option reflects the view of some scholars that ripeness is unavoidably
intertwined with the merits of the claim. See Amar, supra note 165, at 718 n.155 (commenting that
"ripeness obviously turns on one's conception not of [A]rticle IlI, but of the substantive interests
asserted").
380. 511 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2007).
381. Id. at 31.
382. See id.

383. 298 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2002).
384. Id. at 554.

385. 504 F.3d 840, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2007).
386. See, e.g., New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499-1504 (10th
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (failing to address the claim under the standard analysis). But see
Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 438 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the claim would be ripe
under the Abbott Laboratorieshardship test).
387. See, e.g., New Mexicans for Bill Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1499-1504 (citations omitted)

(applying the two-factor Abbott Laboratoriesanalysis and simply claiming that it is relaxed).
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Perhaps one could delve into district court decisions and use traditional
common law reasoning to find some insight into what the relaxed ripeness
standard means, but the decisions from the district courts are too contradictory to
contain any consistent rules. Some of the cases seem straightforward. For
example, the Eastern District of New York held that, even under the relaxed
ripeness test, "uncertainty about enforcement" of a law was insufficient to meet
the threshold for showin a credible threat of enforcement.388 But other cases
offer divergent guidance. 89 The Middle District of Florida, for example, held
that a challenge to a suspension of an adult entertainment business's license was
not ripe because the government agency had not issued a final decision.390 Yet
in a case in the Eastern District of Virginia, the government agency's argument
that its interest in issuing a final decision meant that the case was not ripe did not
prevail, and the court instead held that the case was ripe. 391 These examples
illustrate how the district court decisions offer only limited insight into what the
relaxed ripeness standard means. Thus, the federal circuit courts need to offer
more guidance regarding how the relaxed ripeness standard operates in practice.
If federal courts continue using the lower ripeness standard for First
Amendment claims, then they must offer more concrete guidance on how that
lower standard impacts the analysis of ripeness in such cases. Although scholars
can deduce that this lower standard affects the prudential, rather than
constitutional, basis of ripeness, exactly how much lower the prudential
considerations are remains unclear. Even if free speech claims deserve or need a
lower ripeness standard, courts ought to make that lower standard clear for
lawyers, litigants, and scholars. A more comprehensive explanation of how the
lower standard affects judicial decisionmaking would shed light on the relaxed
ripeness standard that courts so often note applies in First Amendment cases.392
Yet courts have consistently failed to give such guidance, and this failure has
served only to confuse and muddle the ripeness doctrine.

388. See Sanger v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 151, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
389. See, e.g., Beeline Entm't Partners, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Orange, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1339
(M.D. Fla. 2003) (citing Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir.
1997)).
390. See id.
391. See Allen, Allen, Allen & Allen v. Williams, 254 F. Supp. 2d 614, 626 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
392. Providing clarity allows for a more meaningful and useful discussion of an issue. See,
e.g., Wm. Grayson Lambert, Note, The Real Debate over the Senate's Role in the Confirmation
Process, 61 DUKE L.J. 1283, 1324-27 (2012) (clarifying the true tension between approaches to the
Senate's role in the confirmation of judges in an effort to provide a framework for meaningful
discussions regarding how the Senate should approach its constitutional duty to advise and consent
to judicial nominations).
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V. CONCLUSION

Like many justiciability doctrines, ripeness is far from clear or easy. One
area in which courts have generally reached a consensus concerns ripeness and
free speech claims: the normal ripeness test is relaxed in these cases because of
the importance of free speech rights and the need to protect speech from any
potential chilling effect.
Although this consensus is appealing because it offers some stability in the
law, it is not as logically sound as it is often thought to be. First, the value
placed on free speech rights ignores the importance of other constitutional rights,
which are effectively devalued when free speech rights are put on a pedestal in
the ripeness doctrine. Second, the normal ripeness test likely provides sufficient
protection to ensure that free speech rights are not improperly threatened. And
third, even if free speech rights deserve or need this relaxed ripeness standard,
the current consensus offers insufficient guidance as to how this standard
actually functions. Therefore, courts should apply the standard ripeness test in
free speech cases to promote a better understanding of ripeness and free speech
claims.
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